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INTRODUCTION
Inside counsel have to manage expectations in a variety of ways. They need to
provide guidance to their business units; they need to ensure compliance with a
network of statutes and rules relating to their organization's industry; and they need
to monitor the work and the cost of their outside counsel. Many, if not most, inside
counsel have worked in law firms and understand how legal work gets billed. But
what happens when inside counsel find themselves in a situation in which many of
the parties involved have little incentive or ability to examine and manage the costs
of the professionals involved in the case? I'm speaking, of course, of chapter 11
bankruptcies.
In chapter 11 cases, professionals working for the debtor or the creditors'
committee-once their employment has been approved by the bankruptcy court-are
paid out of a collective pool.2 They're either paid from general unsecured funds3 or
they're paid from a carve-out of a secured creditor's collateral. When they're paid
I The fees and expenses in the larger cases can run into the hundreds of millions. See, e.g., Mark Chediak,
PG&E Spent $127 Million in Bankruptcy Costs, Fees in Two Months, BLOOMBERG (May 2, 2019),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-02/pg-e-spent-127-million-on-bankruptcy-costs-fees-in-
two-months ("[PG&E] expects Chapter 11 costs for this year to range from $360 million to $430 million,
according to a slide presentation posted online Thursday. The costs for the first quarter included $114 million
in financing and $24 million in 'legal and other costs,' offset by $11 million in interest income."); see also Tom
Corrigan, Joel Eastwood & Jennifer S. Forsyth, The Power Players That Dominate Chapter 11 Bankruptcy,
WALL ST. J. (May 24, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/graphics/bankruptcy-power-players/ ("In the case of
Lehman Brothers, the largest and most expensive chapter 11 in history, bankruptcy professionals took home
more than $2.5 billion."). Not all of these fees and expenses, though, are due to the costs of the bankruptcy
itself. Some of them would have been incurred with or without a bankruptcy filing.
2 See, e.g., Nancy B. Rapoport, The Case for Value Billing in Chapter 11, 7 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 117, 121-
26 (2012) [hereinafter Value Billing] (walking the reader through the process of how certain professionals get
paid in chapter 11 cases).
3 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(2) (2012). They are, of course, paid as a high priority, before the regular general
unsecured creditors get paid at all.
Here's a nice explanation of how a carve -out works:
Secured creditors may also expressly consent to payment of certain costs and
expenses of administering a bankruptcy estate from their collateral. Such administrative
"carve-outs" are common in chapter 11 cases involving a debtor with assets that are fully
or substantially encumbered by the liens of pre-bankruptcy lenders. As part of a post-
petition financing or cash collateral agreement, a pre-bankruptcy lender may agree that a
specified portion of its collateral can be used to pay administrative claims, such as
professional fees and expenses incurred by a DIP, trustee, or official committee; statutory
fees; or "burial" costs that may be incurred if a chapter 11 case is later converted to a
chapter 7 liquidation.
Collateral Surcharge Denied Despite Inadequacy of Carve-Out Due to Express Waiver in DIP Financing
Agreement, JONES DAY, (July/Aug. 2008), https://www.jonesday.com/Collateral-Surcharge-Denied-Despite-
Inadequacy-of-Carve-Out-Due-to-Express-Waiver-in-DIP-Financing-Agreement-08-01-2008/. For another
good discussion of a carve-out, see, for example, East Coast Miner LLC v. Nixon Peabody LLP (In re
Licking River Mining, LLC), 911 F.3d 806, 812 (6th Cir. 2018).
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from general unsecured funds, the normal relationship between client and counsel, in
which counsel's fees come directly from the client's own funds, doesn't exist. Instead,
those payments come from a pot of money that is one step removed from the client's
pocketbook. Even when the funds come from a carve-out from a particular secured
creditor's collateral, that creditor might not have enough information to be able to
monitor the fees and expenses incurred by all of the court-approved professionals in
the case.6 The lack of an incentive (or the ability) to review professionals' fees in a
In Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases . . .a secured creditor asserts a lien on the assets of a
debtor's estate. A carve-out provision is necessary and generally included in the parties'
negotiations to provide assurance to hired bankruptcy professionals that they will be
paid if the debtor liquidates after they have incurred fees and expenses. A carve-out
serves in effect to give a higher-priority security interest to the professionals over the
secured creditors. Notably, the bankruptcy laws specifically give high priority to
administrative expenses in bankruptcy proceedings, such as attorney fees. Without a
carve-out from prepetition secured liens, a secured creditor with a blanket lien over all
the debtors' assets can prevent professionals who assisted in the bankruptcy from being
paid ....
Id. (citations omitted). See also Josef S. Athanas, Matthew L. Warren & Emil P. Khatchatourian, Bankruptcy
Needs to Get its Priorities Straight: A Proposal for Limiting the Leverage of Unsecured Creditors'
Committees When Unsecured Creditors are "Out-of-the -Money," 26 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 93, 104-05
(2018) (discussing the increased use of carve-outs and the dynamics that carve-outs can create).
5 When fees are paid from a carve-out, the secured creditor often watches the legal costs more closely and
often sets fee caps or budgets to control costs. There is far less oversight when the fees are paid from general
unsecured funds. See, e.g., Matthew Adam Bruckner, Crowdsourcing (Bankruptcy) Fee Control, 46 SETON
HALL L. REV. 361, 381-83 (2016) [hereinafter Crowdsourcing] ("[E]ven generally sophisticated clients may
notbe sophisticated consumers of professional corporate bankruptcy services."); Clifford J. White III & Walter
W. Theus, Jr., Professional Fees Under the Bankruptcy Code: Where Have We Been, and Where Are We
Going?, 29 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Jan. 2011 at 22, 78 (quoting In re Armstrong World Indus. Inc., 366 B.R.
278, 281 n.2 (D. Del. 2007) (pointing out that most parties in bankruptcy "typically have no motive for
objecting to other professionals' fee petitions"); id. at 79 ("Outside of bankruptcy, a unitary corporate actor,
driven by its business objectives, realizes all of the value from both its professionals' work and its own efforts
at controlling professional fees. In bankruptcy, those functions-retention, invoice review and payment
approval-are divided among the court and various actors with different responsibilities and incentives. Any
savings from controlling professional fees do not necessarily inure to the benefit of the debtor but are more
likely to benefit the unsecured creditors. The debtor, therefore, does not have the same incentive in bankruptcy
to control professional fees as it does outside."); Nancy B. Rapoport, Rethinking Fees in Chapter 11
Bankruptcy Cases, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 263, 263-65 (2010) [hereinafterRethinking Fees] ("Contrary to what
some of my colleagues think, the process for awarding professional fees isn't completely broken, but it suffers
from a fundamental [problem] of its own: although professionals' fees typically come from the pot of money
left over to divide among unsecured creditors, there's no easy mechanism to ensure that the fees stay
reasonable. We all talk about the fact that the reasonableness of fees can be a problem, especially in the larger
Chapter 11 cases, but we never do anything about it.") (footnotes omitted); Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall
S. Thomas, Timing Matters: Forum Shopping by Insolvent Corporations, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1357, 1369
(2000) ("Under the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor's attorneys are paid from the firm's assets, ahead of all
prepetition, unsecured creditors. This payment scheme creates an agency problem the managers hire the
attorneys, but then have little incentive to monitor the amount of fees paid by the estate. Instead, the group
that pays these fees is the debtor's unsecured creditors.") (footnotes omitted); Cynthia A. Baker, Other People's
Money: The Problem of Professional Fees in Bankruptcy, 38 ARIz. L. REV. 35, 37 (1996) (discussing the
difference between the monitoring of professional fees inside bankruptcy and outside bankruptcy).
6 My friend Joe Tiano has observed: "Creditors with the most at stake seem to view legal fees as a rounding
error, minimally affecting the computation of the estate financial situation. In a sense, they're right, but the
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meaningful way leads to billing inefficiencies that can affect everyone involved in
the case.
Large chapter 11 cases can have fees that run into the hundreds of millions of
dollars.7 That's one of the reasons that, in 2013, the Executive Office of the United
States Trustee promulgated additional guidelines that affect" legal fees in large
chapter 11 cases. 9 Bankruptcy courts have been appointing fee examiners and fee
committees in large cases'0 to aid the courts in their duty to ensure that the fees and
expenses of estate-paid professionals are reasonable." I've been one of those people
charged with helping bankruptcy courts review fees.1 2 As such, I've seen first-hand
what happens when the professionals involved in high-stakes, bet-the-company
litigation 3 serve as the actual decisionmakers, rather than involving their clients
deeply in their decisions. This article will discuss the dynamics that create a
disincentive for most parties to monitor fees in large chapter 11 cases and will then
provide suggestions to inside counsel whose organizations find themselves involved
in those cases-as the debtor, as a member ofthe creditors' committee, or as a secured
creditor whose collateral is being tapped for the carve-out to pay the professionals'
fees.
I. THE FRAMEWORK
Several people, including me, have talked about the challenges of reviewing
estate-paid professionals' fees and expenses in large chapter 11 cases:
numbers can be staggering nonetheless." Comments from Joe Tiano to author on an earlier draft (on file with
author).
7 See supra note 1.
8 Well, sort of. Unless a court adopts those guidelines, then only the Office of the United States Trustee is
governed by them, leading to a situation in which the guidelines will foreshadow the objections that the United
States Trustee might make but won't, in themselves, bind anyone else.
9 Notice of Internal Procedural Guidelines, 78 Fed. Reg. 36248 (June 17, 2013), https://www.justice.Gov/
sites/default/files/ust/legacy/201 3/06/28/FeeGuidelines.pdf [hereinafter Procedural Guidelines].
10 Of course, courts appointed fee examiners long before the promulgation of the large case guidelines. For
example, I was appointed in In re Airant Corp., 303 B.R. 319 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003), way back in 2003,
and inIn re Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 421 B.R. 231 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2009), in 2009.
11 See 11 U.S.C. § 330 (2012).
12 I've been the fee examiner, the independent member of the fee committee, or a fee expert in a number of
cases. See generallyIn re Toys "R" Us Prop. Co. I, LLC, 598 B.R. 233 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2019) (fee examiner);
In re Toys "R" Us, Inc., 587 B.R. 304 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2018) (fee examiner); In re Caesars Entm't Operating
Co., 561 B.R. 441 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2016) (independent member of fee committee); In re Residential Capital,
LLC, 519 B.R. 890 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014) (consultant on reasonableness of fees for the liquidating trust); In
re Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., 445 B.R. 143 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (expert witness for the fee examiner);
In re Motors Liquidation Co., 447 B.R. 142 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (expert witness for the fee examiner); In
re Station Casinos, Inc., No. BK-09-52477-GWZ, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 5447 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010) (fee
examiner); In re ASARCO, LLC, No. 05-21207, 2009 WL 8176641 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) (expert witness
for the reorganized debtor); In re Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 421 B.R. 231 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2009) (court's fee
expert and chair of the Fee Review Committee); In re Mirant Corp., 303 B.R. 319 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003)
(court's fee expert and chair of the Fee Review Committee).
13 In other words, all big chapter 11 cases.
LEGAL FEES IN LARGE CHAPTER 11 CASES
The bankruptcy court has oversight of the payment of
professional fees, but the review of those fees can be incredibly time-
consuming and is highly detail-driven. Those professionals who
submit their bills for court review represent real clients, but those
real clients aren't writing the ultimate checks. In most non-
bankruptcy settings, there's a metaphorical moment when the
professional pushes a bill across the table to the client and waits for
the client to react. If the client questions a bill, the professional may
well end up lowering it.
When it comes to estate-paid Chapter 11 fees, the professionals
are pushing their bills across the table, but on the other side of the
table, the client charged with evaluating the reasonableness of the
bill may have no meaningful way to put the bill into context.
Moreover, because no single client is charged with footing the
professionals' entire bill, it's possible that none of the clients really
cares how much these professionals are charging. In essence, the
client sitting at the table is a stand-in for entities with little voice (and
little individual stake) in determining how the professional makes his
billable decisions. And sitting at another table, far away, is the
bankruptcy court.1 4
Before I discuss the dynamics that create this odd situation, let's walk through the
various Bankruptcy Code sections that allow certain professionals to be paid from
funds other than from a single client's finances. We'll start with section 327" of the
Bankruptcy Code, which allows the trustee1 6 to hire professional persons-the
lawyers, accountants, financial advisors, investment bankers, brokers, and so on-
with the bankruptcy court's approval.1 7 Section 327(a) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, the trustee, with the
court's approval, may employ one or more attorneys, accountants,
appraisers, auctioneers, or other professional persons, that do not
hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate, and that
14 Rethinking Fees, supra note 5, at 265 (footnotes omitted).
15 A good general rule is that the sections in chapters 1, 3, and 5 of the Bankruptcy Code apply to the other
chapters, which themselves provide specific forms of debt relief. See 11 U.S.C. § 103.
16 In case you're saying to yourself, "this statute talks about what a trustee can do, but what about the debtor-
in-possession-how can the DIP hire professionals?," the answer is found in 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) ("Subject to
any limitations on a trustee serving in a case under this chapter, and to such limitations or conditions as the
court prescribes, a debtor in possession shall have all the rights, other than the right to compensation
under section 330 of this title, and powers, and shall perform all the functions and duties, except the duties
specified in sections 1 106(a)(2), (3), and (4) of this title, of a trustee serving in a case under this chapter.").
Confused about what a "debtor in possession" is? It's the entity formed once a debtor files a chapter 11 petition.
Cf id. § 1101(1).
17 Id. § 327(a).
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are disinterested persons,' 8 to represent or assist the trustee in
carrying out the trustee's duties under this title. 19
Professionals for official committees in the case can also hire their own professionals,
predicated on bankruptcy court approval.20
The fees for performing a professional's duties (either for the debtor in possession
or for the committee) can be based on hourly rates or can be "on any reasonable terms
and conditions of employment, including on a retainer, on an hourly basis, on a fixed
or percentage fee basis, or on a contingent fee basis." 21 If yOu love statutory
construction, the whole process-from approval of employment through awarding
Is For the definition of what a "disinterested person" is, see 11 U.S.C. § 101(14).
19 Id. § 327(a). There's a lot more to section 327 than this one subsection, but for our purposes, section 327(a)
is the most useful.
20 See id. § 1103(a) ("At a scheduled meeting of a committee appointed under section 1102 of this title, at
which a majority of the members of such committee are present, and with the court's approval, such committee
may select and authorize the employment by such committee of one or more attorneys, accountants, or other
agents, to represent or perform services for such committee.").
21 See id. § 328(a) ("The trustee, or a committee appointed under section 1102 of this title, with the court's
approval, may employ or authorize the employment of a professional person under section 327 or 1103 of this
title, as the case may be, on any reasonable terms and conditions of employment, including on a retainer, on
an hourly basis, on a fixed or percentage fee basis, or on a contingent fee basis."). Section 328(a) goes on to
specify that, if a professional's terms of employment are approved under section 328, instead of the more
general provisions of section 327, those employment terms are sacrosanct even if they result in
overcompensation, as viewed from the vantage point of the end of the case. The only way to get out from
under a section 328(a) approval of specific terms is if the terms are considered "improvident," based on an
"unforeseen and unforeseeable" standard. See id. ("Notwithstanding such terms and conditions, the court may
allow compensation different from the compensation provided under such terms and conditions after the
conclusion of such employment, if such terms and conditions prove to have been improvident in light of
developments not capable of being anticipated at the time of the fixing of such terms and conditions.").
Section 328(a) provides that a court may alter the terms and conditions of a flat fee
"if such terms and conditions prove to have been improvident in light of developments
not capable of being anticipated at the time of the fixing of such terms and conditions."
However, modification under § 328(a) "is severely constrained," and any motion seeking
to modify such terms "has a high hurdle to clear." Unanticipated circumstances are not
enough to satisfy the improvident standard; rather, the developments and circumstances
requiring modification must not have been capable of anticipation in order for the court
to revisit a flat fee approved under § 328(a). As such, modification of a flat fee has been
rejected where (1) a contingency-fee case was settled after 2.7 hours of work, equating
to an hourly rate of $1,235; (2) the divergent positions of the debtor and unsecured
creditors resulted in the rejection of multiple settlements; (3) the law firm received
instructions from both the officers and shareholders of the debtor; (4) litigation was
unusually long and protracted; and (5) the law firm proved to be an obstacle-not an
asset to ultimate settlement. In contrast, the following four factors, when combined,
were deemed incapable of anticipation: (1) length of proceeding where initial
engagement was to be for one month culminating in a sale; (2) significant unforeseen
debtor management and reporting deficiencies; (3) the debtor's chief financial officer was
replaced twice in the first months of the case; and (4) the lack of leadership of debtor,
which had always taken instructions from a nondebtor parent.
Jerald I. Ancel & Jeffrey J. Graham, Do Alternative FeeArrangements Have a Placefor Chapter ]] Counsel?,
31 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2012 at 42, 94-95 (footnotes omitted).
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interim fees and expenses to awarding final fees and expenses-will be right up your
alley, as it can get complicated. But I'm going to simplify the concepts here.22
Section 330 allows a bankruptcy court to award, after notice and a hearing,
reasonable fees and expenses to the court-appointed professionals. 23 Those court-
approved fees and expenses are given a high administrative priority, which means
that they get paid in full before administrative claims lower in the pecking order (and
all general unsecured claims) get paid at all.24 If one thinks of the fees and expenses
of the court-appointed professionals as funding the reorganization (or the orderly
liquidation) of the chapter 11 debtor-in-possession, it makes sense that the funding of
those fees comes from those who are benefitting from the professionals' efforts. As
Professor Stephen Lubben puts it,
Being in chapter 11 means that creditors' recovery on their claims
becomes higher than zero. The professional fees are the cost of
22 Forgive me, bankruptcy mavens.
23 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) provides:
After notice to the parties in interest and the United States Trustee and a hearing, and
subject to sections 326, 328, and 329, the court may award to . . . a professional person
employed under section 327 or 1103-
(A) reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by the trustee,
examiner, ombudsman, professional person, or attorney and by any paraprofessional
person employed by any such person; and
(B) reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses.
Id. § 330(a)(1). The bankruptcy court can also award less than the fees and expenses requested, see 11 U.S.C.
§ 330(a)(2), and must consider certain factors in determining the reasonableness of the fees and expenses
requested, see 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3)-(4).
24 In terms of who gets paid out and in what order, the reasonable fees and expenses of court-appointed
professionals are second in priority, see 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(2) ("Second [priority], administrative expenses
allowed under section 503(b) of this title . . . ."), meaning that the fees and expenses get paid second from the
pot of money available to unsecured creditors. See also id. § 503(b) ("After notice and a hearing, there shall
be allowed administrative expenses, other than claims allowed under section 502(f) of this title, including ...
(2) compensation and reimbursement awarded under section 3 30(a) of this title . . . ."). Of course, nothing
stops a court-appointed professional from agreeing to take less than the full amount of its administrative claim.
Cf id. § 1 129(a)(9)(A) (stating unless agreed otherwise, administrative claims in chapter 11 must be paid in
cash in full on the effective date of a confirmed plan of reorganization). If you really want your head to spin,
you'll want to read the spate of cases that deal with what happens when court-appointed professionals who are
being paid from a carve-out from the collateral of a secured creditor discover that the carve-out isn't large
enough to cover all of their fees and expenses. See, e.g., In re Molycorp, Inc., 562 B.R. 67, 71 (Bankr. D. Del.
2017) ("[A]bsent specific language not found in the DIP Financing Order at issue here, a dollar-amount cap
on professionals' fee payment, or a carve-out, does not come into play once a Chapter 11 plan is confirmed.
That is because a fundamental statutory requirement of the Bankruptcy Code is that, unless the holder of a
particular claim has agreed to a different treatment, allowed professionals' fees are administrative expenses
that need to be paid in full under any confirmed plan."). Compare E. Coast Miner LLC v. Nixon Peabody LLP
(In re Licking River Mining, LLC), 911 F.3d 806, 810-11 (6th Cir. 2018) (finding lenders were bound to pay
the estate professionals from their collateral, pursuant to a carve-out order, notwithstanding that the case had
been converted to a case under chapter 7), with In re Chieftain Steel, No. 16-10407(1)(11), 2019 WL 1225716,
*5-7 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2019) (holding secured creditor's collateral, part of which was subject to a carve-out
order, was not responsible for paying the balance of the court-appointed professionals' fees and expenses after
the reorganized debtor ran out of funds).
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moving to that higher recovery. The notion that money paid to
professionals belongs to creditors is true only if the creditors could
realize that value without the professionals.2 5
Courts determine the reasonableness of a court-appointed professional's fees and
expenses by periodically 26 reviewing the fee applications that the professional files. 27
These fee applications, especially in very large chapter 11 cases, can be voluminous 28
and opaque. 2 9 Any large legal bill (in or out of bankruptcy) is extremely difficult to
parse for reasonableness:
Think about how large and foreboding the average legal bill
looks to a client. (If you've never seen a large legal bill, think back
to any hospital bills that you've seen.) They can go on for pages and
pages (or screens and screens), and they tend to be organized by date.
For each date in a billing cycle on which work was performed, the
bill lists who worked on a matter, what each professional did, how
long the work took (typically, these days, in six-minute billing
increments), and each professional's billing rate. For bills longer than
a few pages, the amount of time it would take to go through each
25 Stephen J. Lubben, What We "Know About Chapter ]] Cost Is Wrong, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
141, 144 (2012).
26 11 U.S.C. § 331 permits periodic payment for compensation, "not more than once every 120 days after
an order for relief in a case under this title," after notice and a hearing. 11 U.S.C. § 331.
27 Section 330(a) requires "notice and a hearing," and the notice part is always present, but hearings in
bankruptcy cases can sometimes be quite summary, or even non-existent. Id. § 330(a); see also id. § 102
(defining how much of a hearing, if any, is required under the particular circumstances of the noticed event).
Most fee applications, though, are heard in open court, even if there's no one objecting to the fees.
28 See Value Billing, supra note 2, at 127-29 (discussing how many pages can go into a set of monthly fee
statements or interim fee applications in large chapter 11 cases); Nancy B. Rapoport, The Client Who Did Too
Auch, 47 AKRON L. REV. 121, 123-25 (2014) [hereinafter Client] (discussing the effects of any party in
interest's actions on other parties in interest and the concomitant ripple effect of work and, thus, fees). For
another rough estimate of how voluminous fee applications can get, see Crowdsourcing, supra note 5, at 371-
74.
In a large corporate bankruptcy case, a bankruptcy court typically receives fee
applications from twelve to sixteen professional firms every three months, and fee
applications are usually thirty or more pages. Assuming there are twelve professional
firms each filing a thirty-page application every three months for two years, Fee
Controllers [defined as bankruptcy judges and Assistant United States Trustees] must
closely scrutinize 2880 pages of "single-spaced, small font lines of time entries and
expense details" over the course of the case. Add only four more professional firms, and
Fee Controllers will have to scrutinize 3840 pages (and hundreds of thousands of lines
of time and expense entries) instead.
Id. Because the fees are a matter of public record, they provide useful information to parties, to the bankruptcy
court, to fee examiners, and to researchers. But, because they're a matter of public record, the professionals
who file them are often worried that some of the time entries will reveal future strategies. Cf infra note 33.
29 The size and opacity of the bills explain why fee examiners' reviews are taken so seriously by bankruptcy
courts.
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element in a bill is enormous. When the time entries are vague
("discuss strategy") or lumped together ("prepare for and attend
hearing"; "research, draft, and revise contract"), parsing the bills
becomes exponentially more difficult, especially when done
manually. Zoning out while reviewing a stack of time entries is
understandable. But without some way of analyzing the bills
systematically or programmatically, clients must hope that the work
performed fell within the agreed-upon guidelines and must trust that
the lawyers preparing the bills were both honest and attentive to the
minutiae of who was doing what and when. Hope and trust are nice,
but normally they're not enough.30
Inside counsel are, of course, trained to read complex and lengthy documents.
Structurally, then, inside counsel for the debtor in possession, for a member of the
unsecured creditors' committee (or for any unsecured creditor), or for the secured
creditor whose collateral is being carved out for professional fees could comb through
the various fee applications and ask probing questions of the professionals seeking
payment from the estate. But there are a number of factors that might cause a review
of fee applications3' to be a low priority.32
II. DYNAMICS AFFECTING FEES IN LARGE CHAPTER 11 CASES
The sheer volume of the fee applications themselves is one reason why so few
parties in interest in a case pay attention to them. 33 But there are other dynamics at
30 Nancy B. Rapoport & Joseph R. Tiano, Jr., LegalAnalytics, Social Science, and Legal Fees: Reimagining
"Legal Spend" Decisions in an Evolving Industry, 35 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1269, 1274-75 (2019) [hereinafter
Legal Analytics] (footnotes omitted).
31 Or monthly statements, if a court enters a Knudsen-type order. See U.S. Trustee v. Knudsen Corp. (In re
Knudsen Corp.), 84 B.R. 668 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1988) (allowing monthly payments to court-appointed
professionals, per 11 U.S.C. § 328(a), under certain conditions).
32 And, by the time that the fee application or monthly statement has been filed, the work has already been
done. A better time to catch any problems or to change behavior, though, is at the beginning of the case, by
setting up some good ground rules. See discussion infra Part III(B).
3 Sometimes, though, certain parties pay a lot of attention to the time entries attached to a fee application.
See, e.g., Motion of the Official Committee of Second Priority Noteholders to Reconsider Order Granting
Debtors' Application for Retention of Kirkland & Ellis LLP and Kirkland & Ellis International LLP ¶ 15, In
re Caesars Entm't Operating Co., 561 B.R. 441 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2016) (No. 15-01145), ECF 2514 ("In fact,
based on Kirkland's time entries, it appears that Kirkland lawyers (David Zott and Nicole Greenblatt) prepared
a revised draft of the August board minutes on May 12, 2015 - more than two weeks before this Court granted
the application."); Declaration of Joshua M. Mester in Support of Motion of the Official Committee of Second
Priority Noteholders to Reconsider Order Granting Debtors' Application for Retention of Kirkland & Ellis
LLP and Kirkland & Ellis International LLP ¶ 12, In re Caesars Entm't Operating Co., 561 B.R. 441 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 2016) (No. 15-01145), ECF 2515 ("Attached hereto as Exhibit J are excerpts of the time entries
attached to the First Interim Fee Application Of Kirkland & Ellis LLP and Kirkland & Ellis International LLP,
Attorneys For The Debtors And Debtors In Possession, For The Period From January 15, 2015 Through And
Including May 31, 2015 [ECF No. 1903]."); Jacqueline Palank, Caesars Battles Spill Over to Lawyers, WALL
ST. J. (Nov. 15, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/caesars-battles-spill-over-to-lawyers-1447792427
(describing the fight between Jones Day and Kirkland & Ellis over the alleged problems with the retention of
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stake as well.
A. The Choice of Professionals and the Challenges of Being Involved in "Bet the
Company" Litigation
Professor Stephen Lubben has found a positive correlation between the size of a
chapter 11 case and the choice of certain law firms to represent the debtor in
possession:
[I]ncreases in both the number of employees and the size of the
debtor's assets positively increase the probability that the debtor will
select one of the three leading law firms as its bankruptcy counsel.
To be sure, the model only partially explains the decision to choose
these large law firms. Factors outside of the model, such as the extent
of the preexisting relationship between debtor and law firm, plainly
influence the choice of counsel. Also potentially important are the
Bankruptcy Code's own retention rules, which may reduce the
number of law firms eligible to represent a debtor.
Another potential factor, also exceedingly difficult to measure,
is the prestige that debtor's management may experience from such
a choice. However paradoxical it may seem that choosing
bankruptcy counsel might be associated with "prestige," this is just
another variant of the classic Berle and Means problem resulting
from the separation of ownership and control. Management receives
private benefits from telling their peers that they have hired a "big
New York firm" to handle their reorganization. In addition, risk
adverse managers, who may fear that bankruptcy may end their
employment by the debtor, have every incentive to hire lawyers that
may exceed the debtor's needs. With their jobs at stake, and the
shareholders' or the junior creditors' money to spend, why not "hire
the best"?3 4
That the larger chapter 11 debtors have a high-stakes reason for choosing an
experienced and well-staffed law firm is not surprising. Chapter 11 is life or death
for companies (most of the time).35 Nor is it surprising that there's a halo effect in
Kirkland & Ellis in the case); Nell Gluckman, Kirkland, Jones Day in Caesars Bankruptcy Showdown, AM.
LAWYER (Jan. 15, 2015) (same).
3 Stephen J. Lubben, Choosing Corporate Bankruptcy Counsel, 14 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 391, 403-
04 (2006) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Counsel]. But see id. at 392 ("Predictably, large debtors
tend to hire large law firms while small debtors tend to hire smaller law firms. But mid-sized debtors hire law
firms of all sizes. And debtor size only explains a small part of the decision to hire one of the leading law firms
as bankruptcy counsel. In short, the market defies easy, anecdotal explanation.").
3 See, e.g., Alan Brown, Thomas L. Sager & Rafael X. Zahralddin-Aravena, A Value Added Look At
Corporate Bankruptcy, 34 No. 2 ACC DOCKET 76, 77 (2016) [hereinafter Value Added] ("There is no clearer
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terms of the choice of firms: "Firm X was the main counsel for the debtor in
possession in five large chapter 11 cases in the last year, so clearly Firm X is the firm
that I should choose for our chapter 11 case."3 6 At some point, though, Firm X gets
overextended and can't take on yet another large chapter 11 case, which opens the
door for other, quite similar law firms3 7 to get the nod. And, if the same key law
firms get hired as main counsel for the debtor in possession or for the creditors'
committee precisely because of their extensive expertise in large chapter 11 cases,
then there's a logical tendency for inside counsel to trust what their bankruptcy
counsel are telling them. Even very experienced corporate counsel might not be
experienced either in the intricacies of chapter 11 work or its cost.38
example of 'bet your company' litigation than a restructuring or liquidation under Chapter 11 of the US
Bankruptcy Code."). Of course, firms that file for chapter 11, reorganize, then file another chapter 11 case (or
two) later on the "Chapter 22 or Chapter 33" cases-suggests that some reanimation may be occurring,
followed by some sort of zombie afterlife. Cf MARY SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN (1818). For a recent chapter
22, see Jeremy Hill, Charming Charlie, Back in Bankruptcy, To Close All Stores, BLOOMBERG (July 11,2019),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-1 1/charming-charlie-back-in-bankruptcy-to-close-all-
stores.
36 Followed, of course, by another company doing pre-bankruptcy planning and deciding that, because Firm
X now is main counsel in six large chapter 11 cases in the past year, it's reasonable to choose Firm X-making
seven cases for Finn X, then eight, and so on.
37
Look: We invited twelve firms to bid for this work. All twelve could (and did) tell
us that their firms are exceptionally talented in this area. All twelve also told us that their
firms do precisely this same work for many other clients, and those other clients are
delighted with the work. Across the board, all twelve firms were willing to be flexible on
fees.
When you speak, you all sound the same. And, so far as I know, you might all be
telling the truth. I don't doubt for a second that many of the finest firms in the world do
good work and have satisfied clients. So the things that you insist set you apart you say
that you do good work and that your clients like you-don't set you apart at all. At best,
they make you one of the pack, which gives you a one in twelve chance of winning the
RFP.
Value Billing, supra note 2, at 147 (quoting Mark Herrmann, Inside Straight: The Delusion of Personal
Exceptionalism (Aug. 2011, 10:21 AM), http://abovethelaw.com/2011/08/inside-straight-the-delusion-of-
personal-exceptionalism/); see also Client, supra note 28, at 127-28 ("If most top law firms (big or small)
have well-credentialed, hard-working, smart lawyers, then it's difficult for them to compete on the basis that
'our lawyers are better than their lawyers.' It's like Lake Wobegon: all the lawyers are strong (and good-
looking). If all of the potential lawyers are good, then they'd best be competing on the basis of providing faster
and more complete service.") (footnotes omitted).
38
[A]ll indications are that general counsel offices do a good job monitoring their outside
advisors.
But most legal departments-especially outside of financial institutions-have very
little bankruptcy expertise. This places the debtor in a position of dependence on its
bankruptcy counsel: the debtor's in-house counsel will have to trust their bankruptcy
counsel, and will have little insight into which matters are truly important, and which
matters might be ignored.
Stephen J. Lubben, The Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy: How Little We Know 22 (Seton Hall Pub. Law
Research, Paper No. 2446663, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2446663.
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But brand-name law firms are expensive. Not only are you paying for talent, but
you're paying for all of the bells and whistles with which the fanciest law firms
surround themselves.3 9 I haven't heard of many general counsel getting fired for
hiring law firms with sterling reputations, despite how much those firms might cost.4 0
And the "damn the costs" attitude can be especially true in chapter 11 cases, in which
estate-paid professionals are paid either from a carve-out from secured collateral or
from general unsecured funds.4' A chapter 11 case is the classic "bet the company"
litigation, all right, but the money paying for that bet is coming from an attenuated
source, so there is significantly less incentive to micromanage the decisions that the
bankruptcy lawyers are making.42
B. Limited Information About the Context of the Work that the Estate-Paid
Professionals Have Done
Even if inside counsel were motivated to micromanage its bankruptcy counsel's
decisions, combing through the fee applications is a challenging task. Let's assume
that you serve as the general counsel of the debtor-in-possession. You've engaged
outside counsel (probably teams of outside counsel) and a variety of other
professionals, such as accountants, financial advisors, brokers, and other
professionals whose job it is to help your company reorganize. 43 Chances are decent
3 Phillip A. Pesek, Breaking Away From the Status Quo: A Survival Guide for Managing Outside Counsel
Fees, 26 No. 9 ACC DOCKET 106, 111(2008) [hereinafter Survival Guide] ("If you have a 'bet the company'
type of legal issue or you have an issue that requires certain specialized legal expertise, you will have the
tendency to go to the top[-]flight law firms in the country. However, the overhead of these firms (e.g.[,]
downtown locations, the best, brightest and highly compensated lawyers, and plenty of support staff)
necessitates an hourly rate structure that can be very high.").
40 See Joan C. Williams, Aaron Platt & Jessica Lee, Disruptive Innovation: New Models ofLegal Practice,
67 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 6 (2015) [hereinafter Disruptive Innovation] ("When it comes to high-stakes, bet-the-
company deals and litigation, major companies still typically seek out the most prestigious and powerful
representation they can afford. One informant said, '[a]nything where your company is on the line, you need
the imprimatur of a law firm. I mean, there's no cost sensitivity there, right? You're throwing all the money in
the world at it, because it's way more risky not to."').
41 See supra Part I (discussing various Bankruptcy Code sections that allow certain professionals to be paid
from funds other than from a single client's finances).
42 A recent study by Lynn LoPucki and Joseph Doherty suggests that the appointment of creditors'
committees-which get their own set of professionals, see supra notes 17-26 and accompanying text-may
not be positively correlated with successful reorganizations. Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty,
Bankruptcy Survival, 62 UCLA L. REV. 970, 997-99 (2018).
43 You'll have your main bankruptcy counsel, of course, and in some jurisdictions, you'll also need a main
local counsel. But both of those firms are likely to have some clients that will render them "not-entirely-
disinterested" under the standards of 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) and the definition of disinterestedness in 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(14). So, your main counsel will ask the bankruptcy court for approval to employ conflicts counsel to
handle those few instances in which either your main counsel or your main local counsel-or both can't
represent your interests due to conflicts. For a good discussion of the shifting conflicts in bankruptcy cases
(and because I live for the day that someone, somewhere, will cite this article for the proposition that
appointing conflicts counsel is a good idea), see Nancy B. Rapoport, Turning and Turning in the Widening
Gyre: The Problem ofPotential Conflicts ofInterest in Bankruptcy, 26 CONN. L. REV. 913, 970-72 (1994).
Then you'll want accountants, and financial advisors, and investment banks, and brokers, and other
professionals. If you are a member of the unsecured creditors' committee, you'll also have your main counsel
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that you'll get the "headline version" of what your bankruptcy counsel is doing on the
case (the overall strategy choices), but chances are also decent that you're not being
called several times a day on the myriad tactical decisions that your bankruptcy
counsel is making.4 4 Unless your bankruptcy counsel is filling you in on all of the
tactics,45 though, by the time you get the bill,46 you'll have to piece together what
happened and why before you can start to make sense of the bill.4 7
The problem is that you will never have enough information. You could get more
information-for example, why a partner choose this associate to do a task instead of
that associate, or why Partner A reviewed a draft, rather than Partner B 4"-but the
time sheets won't give that information to you. 4 9 Time sheets also won't tell you if the
and possibly your main local counsel, plus your main and local conflicts counsel. And because you won't trust
the debtor in possession's professionals to be entirely unbiased, you'll want to have your own accountants and
financial advisors, etc., in order to ensure that you're fulfilling your committee's fiduciary duty to represent all
unsecured creditors' interests.
44 Some law firms in other practice areas seem to be considerably more proactive about keeping the client
in the loop on tactics. At least one firm, which focuses primarily on insurance defense, gives each client "a
report at day 15, 45 and every 90 days thereafter that sets out the action steps during the last period and for the
upcoming period that were completed to achieve the agreed upon goal/strategy." E-mail from Dwayne Hermes
to author (July 29, 2019) (on file with author).
45 And, most likely, billing you for providing you with that information.
46 According to the Guidelines, court-appointed professionals should get certain approvals from their clients
before filing their fee applications. See Procedural Guidelines, supra note 9, at 36252 (providing the questions
an applicant is required to answer in the fee application, including an indication of client approval for certain
activities). Remember, though, those Guidelines aren't mandatory unless a bankruptcy court adopts them,
either for a specific case or by a local rule.
47 Joe Tiano has pointed out that, in his experience, there's a risk of a bankruptcy premium that firms might
set billing rates higher so that they can then reduce those rates by a certain percentage across the board: "It's
easier to simply grant an across the board 10% discount than scrutinize the underlying data to meaningfully
address the core reasons for fee reductions." Comments from Joe Tiano to author (on file with author). That
risk of a bankruptcy premium is exactly why the United States Trustee Guidelines were so insistent on getting
information on a firm's non-bankruptcy rates.
48 Or why Junior Associate A did the research for a draft, Mid-Level Associate B did the first draft, Senior
Associate C did the second draft, and Partners D, E, and F reviewed and revised the draft before Paralegal H
filed it.
49 Nor will the narratives in the fee application itself They're never that detailed, and they certainly don't get
into the nitty-gritty of staffing choices for individual tasks.
Those risk-adverse decisions add up over time. In much of the non-bankruptcy
world, a client might review a bill with a first-year (or mid-level) associate checking a
docket weekly for entries and have, as we say down in East Texas, a hissy fit: why would
someone billing $300/hour need to check the docket when a paralegal can do it for half
the cost? That client would pick up the phone, call up the billing partner, and ask for a
discount on that month's bill. But when, say, someone on the unsecured creditors'
committee sees a bill where a new-ish associate has reviewed the docket and puts the
report of "potentially interesting docket entries" into a memo, which every lawyer up the
food chain then reads (each billing time at increasingly higher rates), and which then a
paralegal spends an hour or two filing into different matters for that bankruptcy case, can
that committee member really push back and say that too much work is being billed?
Does that committee member know enough to make that value decision?
Conversely, when two partners draft a motion-at their much-higher rates-instead
of having an associate lower down on the billing scale draft it, the committee member
may be inclined to think that the partners, who can draft more quickly, will be more
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reason that your bankruptcy counsel is taking a particular action is that a professional
working for another constituency made a decision that created a ripple effect.50 (Your
bankruptcy counsel could tell you that information, of course, as part of an overall
description of the month's work, but in the hustle and bustle of fast-paced chapter 11
work, you'd have to establish and enforce strong ground rules for when your
bankruptcy counsel loops you in on various decisions.) 5 ' Unless you and your
bankruptcy counsel have regular heart-to-heart discussions over both strategy and
tactics, you'll be getting the end result-the bill-without a full understanding of why
some of the work was undertaken or why it took so long.52
Even if you had all of the information about your bankruptcy counsel's strategy
and tactics, you probably still wouldn't get a complete picture of the decisions leading
up to the fees and expenses that were billed. 53 Nor would you be able to determine,
efficient at drafting that memo. Maybe that's true; sometimes, it's certainly true. For most
memos, though, pushing the drafting work down to lower-billing associates (and then
writing down the excess time that the associates spent on the draft) will save the client
money....
A bankruptcy judge reviewing the bill will often ask about such decisions as
allocation of workload and writing down time, but in the larger cases, the sheer volume
of the bills makes that detailed scrutiny very difficult.
Rethinking Fees, supra note 5, at 277-78 (footnotes omitted).
5o See, e.g., Stephen J. Lubben, The Chapter 11 Attorneys, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 447, 471 (2012) ("The
regression models in this paper show that the key factor in counsel costs is the size of the web of parties
engaged in a chapter 11 case. The debtor's lead bankruptcy counsel stands in the middle of this web, and the
more parties they have to interact with the greater the amount the debtor will have to pay to attorneys."); cf
supra note 3 1.
51 See infra Part III (discussing the need to lay out and strictly adhere to ground rules).
52 As I've observed elsewhere,
Part of the problem with the checks and balances is that every player has limited
information about the reasons for the choices that the various professionals are making
about how they represent their clients. Even the court and the U.S. Trustee won't see the
strategy sessions that professionals must have to determine how to respond to a
development in the case-and certainly, none of the clients (or client representatives) has
access to the other parties' strategy decisions. Each of the strategy choices that a
professional makes in the case can be justified-or rationalized-as a way of best
positioning the fiduciary that the professional is advising.
And I use the word "rationalized" not in a pejorative sense but because all humans
rationalize their decisions, all the time. Lawyers will rationalize sending several people
to a hearing, rather than one or two, because there might be issues that one of these extra
people needs to cover, and the risk of not sending the right person to the hearing is a risk
of a breach-of-fiduciary-duty lawsuit later. Every estate entity in a case will want its own
financial advisor, in order to check the work of every other financial advisor, because the
decision to rely on other entities' financial advisors could also trigger a breach of
fiduciary duty lawsuit. There's a very real sense that the failure to act is more costly than
the expense of acting.
Rethinking Fees, supra note 5, at 276-77 (footnotes omitted); see also Crowdsourcing, supra note 5, at 392-
93 (discussing the failure of various checks and balances in controlling fees in chapter 11 cases).
53 The decision to write off time involves billing judgment. Some professionals are better at billing
judgment the decision that it's not worth it, in terms of the attorney-client relationship, to bill certain fees or
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in more than a general sense, the reasonableness of the fees and expenses requested.
Why? Malcolm Gladwell, in one of my favorite articles,55 distinguishes between a
puzzle and a mystery. You can solve a puzzle if you have enough information.
Mysteries, though, are not necessarily dependent on having enough information-
you'd need the right information that would enable you to detect patterns that could
help you decipher what's going on.56 One might think that determining the
reasonableness of a fee application was a puzzle: with enough information, someone
could determine reasonableness with a high degree of accuracy. But I think that
determining the reasonableness of fee applications is, in the Gladwellian5 7 sense,
more of a mystery.58 Various non-quantifiable factors will enter into a professional's
decisions about which tasks to undertake, who should do those tasks, and how long
those tasks should take. Those factors can include the fear of leaving an important 59
stone unturned,60 deep-seated and longstanding conflicts between professionals,61
snap decisions that lead to misallocating workflow,6 2 and the relative contentiousness
expenses-than others. See, e.g., J. Scott Bovitz, Being a Great Lawyer (as a Partner), in NANCY B.
RAPOPORT & JEFFREY D. VAN NIEL, LAW FIRM JOB SURVIVAL MANUAL: FROM FIRST INTERVIEW TO
PARTNERSHIP 176-77 (2014) (discussing the value to the client relationship of the notation "no charge" on
portions of a bill). Billing judgment is certainly important in long-term relationships with clients. Sometimes,
though, bankruptcy professionals can forget that chapter 11 can involve repeat players, too, and not just in
chapter 22s or 33s. Cf supra note 35. A debtor in one case might be a creditor in a different case, and vice
versa.
54 Though, obviously, I think that fee examiners and fee committees certainly can help the bankruptcy judge
in that determination. See infra Part III(B)(5) (suggesting the appointment of fee examiners or fee committees
because the process of monitoring fees is time-consuming).55 Malcolm Gladwell, Open Secrets: Enron, intelligence, and the perils of too much information, THE NEW
YORKER (Dec. 31, 2006), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/01/08/open-secrets-3.
56
If things go wrong with a puzzle, identifying the culprit is easy: it's the person who
withheld information. Mysteries, though, are a lot murkier: sometimes the information
we've been given is inadequate, and sometimes we aren't very smart about making sense
of what we've been given, and sometimes the question itself cannot be answered. Puzzles
come to satisfying conclusions. Mysteries often don't.
Gladwell, supra note 55, at 46.
5 "Gladwellian" isn't a word, but it should be.
58
If you sat through the trial of Jeffrey Skilling, you'd think that the Enron scandal
was a puzzle. The company, the prosecution said, conducted shady side deals that no one
quite understood. Senior executives withheld critical information from investors ... .We
were not told enough the classic puzzle premise was the central assumption of the
Enron prosecution.
But the prosecutor was wrong. Enron wasn't really a puzzle. It was a mystery.
Gladwell, supra note 55, at 46.
5 Or any.
60 See infra notes 74-86 and accompanying text.
61 See, e.g., supra note 33.
62 For example, a partner could be working on a particular project late at night, look around, discover that
there are no associates to whom she could delegate some of her lower-level work, and decide that, for
expediency's sake, she'll do it herself, at her higher billable rate.
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of the entire case. Some of those factors may be working on a subconscious level.63
Others may be the results of deliberate thought. But all of the professionals' choices
for their own particular constituents can create chain reactions for the professionals
working with other constituencies. Therefore, gathering all of the facts that
contribute to the fees in a case is probably impossible, even for the judge64 or for the
mythical professional who manages to be at every single hearing and in every single
negotiation. 5 Parsing the fee applications for reasonableness, then, must be
approached more as a mystery. It's not a simple puzzle, and there's an art to parsing
fees. 66 Computer programs that analyze fees and expenses can and do help,67 but they
are not a complete substitute for the human part of the analysis: a combination of
experience and intuition that leads someone to good conclusions.68
63 Ive written about cognitive errors in billing before. See generally Randy D. Gordon & Nancy B. Rapoport,
Virtuous Billing, 15 NEv. L.J. 698 (2015) [hereinafter Virtuous Billing]; Nancy B. Rapoport, "Nudging" Better
Lawyer Behavior: Using Default Rules and Incentives to Change Behavior in Law Firms, 4 ST. MARY'S J.
LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 42 (2014) [hereinafter Lawyer Behavior]; Client, supra note 28; Lois R.
Lupica & Nancy B. Rapoport, Best Practices for Working with Fee Examiners, 32 AM. BANKR. INST. J., June
2013 at 20; Value Billing, supra note 2; Rethinking Fees, supra note 5.
64 The judge is at every hearing (unless another judge is subbing in at a particular hearing). So one would
think that the judge would be aware of everything going on in the case. But the judge is only at the center of
events happening in court, not those in conference rooms or on conference calls or on email chains. Cf Client,
supra note 28, at 122 n.7 ("My friend Ted Gavin has told me that being a judge is like sitting alone in a dark
room with a television, turning the television on fifteen minutes into a show, turning it off again five minutes
later, and then asking the judge to write the entire one-hour script.").
65 And no one's at every single hearing or in every single negotiation in the biggest chapter 11 cases. In
essence, because no one in the case is omnipresent, the reasonableness of the fees will always be a bit of a
mystery.
In the case of puzzles, we put the offending target, the C.E.O., in jail for twenty-four
years and assume that our work is done. Mysteries require that we revisit our list of
culprits and be willing to spread the blame a little more broadly. Because if you can't find
the truth in a mystery-even a mystery shrouded in propaganda-it's not just the fault of
the propagandist. It's your fault as well.
Gladwell, supra note 55, at 53. As Professor Stephen Lubben explains:
Fees are transparent in bankruptcy, in the sense that total amounts billed and time
records must be disclosed. But are the reviews of massive fee applications really likely
to disclose inefficiency in the case?
There are good reasons to doubt it. In particular, without a deep understanding of
the case, which in general will be inconsistent with the attorney-client privilege, it will
often be unclear if time spent on particular issues was well spent.
Lubben, supra note 38.
66 And to monitoring expenses.
67 See discussion inftra Part III(C). As Joe Tiano explains, "Software and data analytics tools can show trends
not normally apparent to the naked eye. Once surfaced, the trends, particularly the aberrations, are reasonably
susceptible to the question: 'Did the issue or case merit a different approach than the industry benchmark?'
Comments from Joe Tiano to author (on file with author).
68 But without the data analysis that forms the first part of fee review, all of the experience and intuition in
the world can only go so far. Cf MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME
37-38 (2004). That's why I think that fee reviewing is more of a mystery than a puzzle:
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So, the factors affecting fees and expenses in large chapter 11 cases include the
choice of bet-the-company bankruptcy counsel and the lack of complete information
on the decisions that the bankruptcy counsel 69 makes. But there are still more factors
affecting these fees and expenses, some of which are based on the ethics rules
requiring counsel to be both competent7 o and diligent.7 ' For counsel representing
fiduciaries, such as the debtor in possession, its board of directors, or any court-
appointed committees, 72 there's additional pressure to get everything right-meaning
that there is pressure not to leave a single stone unturned-that is exacerbated when
the fiduciary client isn't footing the entire bill itself 73
So how can a court, or the U.S. Trustee, or a court-appointed fee expert really tell if the
fees being requested are reasonable? As my colleague Chip Bowles has said, "Fee
reviewing is either rocket science or kindergarten math there's no in-between." Either
the reviewers are going to catch obvious mistakes or over-charges, or they're going to
miss those fees and expenses that reflect an excess of diligence on the professional's part.
Rethinking Fees, supra note 5, at 279.
69 And all of the other court-appointed professionals.
70 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2019) ("A lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.").
71 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2019) ("A lawyer shall act with reasonable
diligence and promptness in representing a client.").
72 A bankruptcy court can always order the appointment of more than just an unsecured creditors' committee
if the circumstances warrant it. See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) (2012) ("On request of a party in interest, the court
may order the appointment of additional committees of creditors or of equity security holders if necessary to
assure adequate representation . . . .").
73 Let's not exclude the effects of rationalization here, either.
[A] lack of awareness-on the part of both professionals and courts-of the risks of
cognitive errors makes fee applications even more opaque and difficult to review. If
you're a lawyer, it's awfully easy to rationalize spending tens of hours on an eight-page
response to a lift-stay motion-especially once you've already submitted the time entries
for it because your brain justifies all of that strategizing, research, and redrafting as
"necessary." Again, rationalization isn't a BigLaw problem. It's a human problem. I've
seen smaller shops (and non-lawyer professionals) submit fee applications with some
unusually high billable time entries, too. If the "client" paying the bill isn't vigilant, and
if the bankruptcy court doesn't have the resources to comb through the bill, the checks
and balances built into the system will fail.
Value Billing, supra note 2, at 137-38 (footnotes omitted); see also Legal Analytics, supra note 30, at 1275
(discussing the various factors that can create "let's pull out all the stops" decisions, including pride in one's
work product, competition for clients, the risk of missing something that can come back to haunt the client-
and the lawyer-later, a law firm's compensation structure, and the ethics rules requiring competence and
diligence); Rethinking Fees, supra note 5, at 267-69 ("In essence, the fiduciaries might be practicing the
equivalent of 'defensive medicine' in an effort to fulfill their fiduciary duties.").
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C. Risk-Adverse Behavior When Representing Fiduciaries.
That pressure to get everything right, unbracketed by the limitation of a single
client's finite budget,74 creates enormous temptations to bring every possible
professional involved in the case to a meeting or hearing, to have multiple layers of
review before filing documents with the court, and to chase down some rabbit holes. 7 5
As Professor Lubben explains,
[D]ebtor's counsel has incentives to over-prepare the case. For
example, some bankruptcy judges are known for chastising counsel
who are unprepared to discuss an issue, no matter how tangential or
trivial. The debtor's general counsel may not know if the company is
receiving efficient representation by reviewing time records of
bankruptcy attorneys, but she could well draw conclusions about
counsel's competence after seeing such an exhibition play out in open
court. Debtor's counsel then has strong incentives to over[-]prepare
for hearings before the judge and avoid such a fate.
Committees, both official and ad hoc, who have an expectation
of having their costs reimbursed by the debtor, will use their lawyers
as a resource and litigation tool without too much thought about fee
accruals. After all, while in some abstract sense greater chapter 11
cost means less recovery for unsecured creditors, the cost is spread
across such a large body of creditors that few individuals will be
sensitive, or motivated enough[,] to object.
Doing more, rather than less, mitigates risk because the less
chance the professional will miss something or be surprised by
74
Even if the risk of a breach of fiduciary duty claim isn't high, lawyers still like being
able to do everything that they can do for their clients. And if the client authorizing
"everything" (or, more accurately, listening to the lawyer explain why he or she is already
doing something to protect that client's interests) isn't the one who has to foot the entire
bill, there's no real incentive to hold back. "Reasonable" fees for a client who's
metaphorically sitting across the table from the professional can be very different from
"reasonable" fees for clients who are each only bearing a small percentage of the bills, in
the case of a committee's constituency, or who aren't bearing any of it, in the case of the
DIP.
Rethinking Fees, supra note 5, at 279 (footnote omitted).
7 My friend Dwayne Hermes points out that all lawyers, as fiduciaries, face the issue of how much to do
(and what to do) to represent the client's interests, and that the bracketing that keeps lawyers from sweating
the fear of doing too little is the "reasonably prudent lawyer" standard. He suspects, and I'll bet that he's right,
that lawyers in all fields wonder if they've done too little. See e-mail from Dwayne Hermes to author (July 29,
2019) (on file with author). But keeping the client in the loop and getting the client's take on upcoming
decisions is tricky in situations in which a small group of people represents an entire class. See, e.g., supra
note 44. The more attenuated the client is from its representatives-for example, the entire group of unsecured
creditors, rather than the members of the unsecured creditors' committee-the harder it may be for the lawyers
to serve everyone to whom their duties flow. See comments from Joe Tiano to author (on file with author).
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something. There is no penalty for waste and there is actually a
reward beyond the fees insofar as counsel leaves no stone unturned,
and thus feels more prepared and less vulnerable heading into a
hearing. 6
Part of the reason, of course, that debtors in possession and creditors' committees
hire the firms with the best reputations in large chapter 11 cases is that they want the
obsessives-those lawyers who, as law students, spent long evenings fretting over
whether a period should be italicized. They want perfectionists because the stakes
are so high, and mistakes can be devastating.7 " But perfectionism is costly and
inefficient, and-not to sound like too much of a broken record-the parties that want
the perfectionists aren't paying for that obsessive work out of their own budgets. This
dynamic has a powerful effect on fees when there's not a constant dialogue between
inside counsel and bankruptcy counsel to distinguish between those tasks that are
important to do and those that one would do if money weren't an issue. In other
words, it's important for inside counsel to establish ground rules at the beginning of
a potential engagement with bankruptcy counsel (and the other bankruptcy
professionals), and then to reinforce those ground rules.
Part of the problem is that bankruptcy counsel may truly believe that it is doing
what the client wants precisely because it's pulling out all of the stops as counsel for
a fiduciary. But even fiduciaries don't have to go down every rabbit hole. As
Professor David Wilkins explains,
With respect to this higher-value work, cost is no longer the
dominant factor. Instead, general counsel[ ] are looking for firms that
76 Lubben, supra note 38 (footnotes omitted); see also Robert J. Keach, Stephen J. Lubben, Thomas J.
Salerno, Clifford J. White III & Brady C. Williamson, Professional Fees Under the Bankruptcy Code: Where
Have We Been and Where Are We Going?, Plenary Session, 120910 ABI-CLE 601 (2010) [hereinafter
Professional Fees] ("While some debtors might have strong inside counsel who are accustomed to managing
relationships with outside counsel, often the debtor's legal department might have dwindled at precisely the
time that enhanced scrutiny of legal and other fees is vital."). Dwayne Hermes offers this salient point: the
more a lawyer communicates the approach that he or she is taking (and also loops the client in on the staffing
choices), the less the client will have sticker shock. Cf E-mail from Dwayne Hermes to author (July 29, 2019)
(on file with author).
7 Periods are round. You can italicize a period, but it will still look round. But students on law reviews are
socialized to care deeply about the minutia of legal writing, see, e.g., J.C. Oleson, You Make Ale [sic]:
Confessions of a Sadistic Law Review Editor, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1135, 1143 (2004) ("Law review
members who are known for being especially obsessive-compulsive are revered as superstars, and called in to
work (James-Bond style) on difficult and high-profile edits."). These are the people who end up in BigLaw.
Cf Malcolm Gladwell, The Tortoise and the Hare, REVISIONIST HISTORY PODCAST (June 27, 2019)
(discussing the determinants of success in law firms).
78 See, e.g., In re Motors Liquidation Co. v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re Motors Liquidation Co.),
777 F.3d 100, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (finding a series of missed proofreading opportunities led
to the inadvertent release of over a billion dollars in collateral); see also Jeremy Byellin, Failure to Review
Paralegal's Error Costs $1.5 Billion, LEGAL SOLUTIONS BLOG (Aug. 5, 2015), https://blog.legalsolutions.
thomsonreuters.com/corporate-counsel/failure-to-review-paralegals-error-costs- 1-5-billion/ (discussing the
case).
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will provide high quality service. But companies mean something
different by "quality service" than most commentators-and most
outside lawyers-typically think. A recent survey by BTI Consulting
Group drives the point home. When asked what they value most in
an outside firm, the overwhelming plurality of general counsel
responded "client focus." Not surprisingly, BTI found that this is
what virtually every law firm believes that they are providing. But
when the consultants asked clients and law firms what they meant by
"client focus," they received very different answers. Twenty-one
percent of GCs, again the overwhelming plurality, responded that
"client focus" means "understanding our business." Only 10% of law
firm respondents suggested a similar understanding. Instead, 21o% of
law firm respondents defined "client focus" as "doing what's best for
the client." Only 3% of GCs offered this interpretation. Although it
may not quite be fair to say that clients are from Mars and lawyers
from Venus, our interviews confirm that GCs put a high premium on
finding lawyers who "understand their business."79
Understanding the business typically means more than just understanding how
the business makes money, who the business's competitors are, and what threats the
business faces. 0 It also means understanding the risk tolerance of the business and
the relationship between that risk tolerance and how much outside help from
professionals the business can afford."' It means understanding that not every task
needs to be an all-hands-on-deck affair that produces reams of memoranda:
7 David B. Wilkins, Team ofRivals? Toward a New Model of the Corporate Attorney-Client Relationship,
78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2067, 2088 (2010) (footnotes omitted); see also Brenda M. Cotter, Litigation
Management: The Critical Steps toAchieve Success and Reduce Costs, 34 No. 8 ACC DOCKET 34, 37 (2016)
("In addition to confirming skill and expertise, you must evaluate how good of a partner your outside counsel
will be. You can determine a lot about the partnership aspect of the relationship by three things: (1) how well
the fee negotiations go; (2) how interested they are in your business goals; and (3) how responsive they are. A
take it or leave it approach to fee negotiations is a huge red flag."); Michael Rappa et al., The Evolving Role
ofthe Corporate Counsel: How Information Technology Is Reinventing Legal Practice, 36 CAMPBELL L. REV.
383, 446-47 (2013) [hereinafter Evolving Role] (discussing the importance of having a discussion between
inside and outside counsel about exactly what problem the client is trying to solve).
so See Wilkins, supra note 79, at 2107 ("[L]awyers who 'understand the business'-particularly how the
business measures and evaluates risk, including legal risk may be far more valuable than [is] technical
competence or skill.").
s1 See, e.g., John S. Dzienkowski, The Future ofBig Law: Alternative Legal Service Providers to Corporate
Clients, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2995, 2999-3000 (2014) ("[Y]ears ago, many corporate clients started to use
standard business budgeting and cost controls to more precisely limit outside legal costs . . . . Additionally,
these clients have also sought to limit high hourly fees across all representations with efforts to create
innovative billing practices. Corporations have relied upon technology to modernize their own business
models; thus[,] they are receptive to technological advances that lead to innovation in legal services.")
(footnotes omitted); Russell G. Pearce & Eli Wald, The Relational Infrastructure of Law Firm Culture and
Regulation: The Exaggerated Death of Big Law, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 109, 131-32 (2013) (suggesting law
firms embrace staffing alternatives to limit costs and better understand corporate clients); Timothy B.
Corcoran, The Changing Definition of Value: What Matters Alost to In-House Counsel, 39 No. 6 LAW PRAC.
46, 46-47 (Nov./Dec. 2013). For two good examples of law firms that involve the client in setting and
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[C]orporate clients have reduced their reliance upon long
memoranda that cost tens of thousands of dollars because they are
written by teams of associates and reviewed by partners. Big Law
clients do not mind paying premium rates for the advice and counsel
of leading partners who have decades of experience underlying their
assessments of legal problems. But they are increasingly unwilling
to hire large law firms to produce overly long legal documents
prepared by inexperienced, young associate lawyers.82
Understanding the business isn't necessarily the issue-at least in chapter 11
cases. The issue is that the costs of understanding, and serving, the business aren't
being borne directly by the client.8 3 That said, every client still has specific goals in
a bankruptcy case. A debtor in possession will hope to reorganize in some fashion.
An unsecured creditor will hope to recover some or all of its debt. Those hopes can
be affected by the size of the professional fees in the case, so even though the fees
discussing metrics, see HERMES LAW, https://www.hernes-law.com/# (last visited Oct. 12, 2019); BARNES &
THORNBERG LLP, https://btlaw.com/firn?section=uncommon-value-overview (last visited Oct. 12, 2019).
These two firms are proactive about the use of metrics, and I'd bet that their clients appreciate that proactivity.
When law firms aren't as proactive, they can run up against inside counsel's pet peeves. As an example, here's
a pithy list of dos and don'ts for outside counsel:
Each in-house attorney-all attorneys for that matter-has his or her likes and
dislikes. Here are some key "don'ts" that outside counsel should keep in mind:
* Don't increase the rates on a matter in the middle of the case.
* Don't send an invoice without reviewing for edits, adjustments, and promised
discounts.
* Don't charge for luxury accommodations (e.g., first-class flights).
* Don't bill more than 10 hours in one day unless necessary.
* Don't send a bill that exceeds the budget without calling to discuss first.
* Don't bill for multiple attorneys attending a deposition or internal meeting
unless such a practice is agreed upon in advance.
* Don't bill for conflict searches and attorney time resolving billing issues.
* Don't bill for learning the basic law in an area.
* Don't bill for time getting an attorney up to speed due to a staff change.
* Don't retain contract personnel without prior approval.
* Don't bill for time creating a new document when a form document is
appropriate.
* Don't incur unnecessary expedited charges (e.g., express courier, overnight
transcription).
Katherine A. Compton, What In-HouseAttorneys Wish Outside Counsel Knew AboutLegal Fees, 75 TEX. B.J.
710, 711 (2012).
82 Dzienkowski, supra note 81, at 3000 (footnote omitted). I would say that these ground rules would go
without saying, but I've seen each of these behaviors in several cases. And Joe Tiano believes that BigLaw's
clients are shifting away from "paying for decades of experience when data analytics projections and outcomes
are a suitable surrogate for 35 years of experience." Comments from Joe Tiano to author (on file with author).
83 See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
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are being paid as administrative claims, there are still good reasons for the client to
monitor those fees.
At least one treatise has suggested that inside counsel can set ground rules for its
bankruptcy counsel. 4 This treatise suggested that inside counsel should reach an
understanding about:
* how much new legal research is likely to be necessary (in other
words, what might the non-routine parts of the case involve?);
* how much case monitoring is going on, and who will be doing
the monitoring (especially useful for creditors with only very
specific needs in a chapter 11 case);
* which professionals at the law firm will be working on the case,
who gets added, and under what circumstances; and
* whether a fixed fee or a contingency fee for particular work
would be more appropriate than using billable hours. 5
That list is a good beginning, and I will have additional suggestions in Part III. But
one of the key dynamics affecting fees in chapter 11 has nothing, really, to do with
bankruptcy. It has to do with the pros and cons of using the billable hour as a way of
measuring value.
84 See James M. Strother, David R. Garfield, James P. Stephenson, & Michael R. Stewart, 4 SUCCESSFUL
PARTNERING BETWEEN INSIDE AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL § 54:7 (Apr. 2019 update).
85 Id. (footnotes omitted).
86 My co-authors and I have joined the chorus of those who view billable hours as an imperfect measure of
value. See, e.g., Dwayne J. Hermes, Erica R. LaVarnway & Nancy B. Rapoport, A Solutions-Oriented
Approach: Changing How Insurance Litigation is Handled by Defense Law Firms, 2017 PROF. L. 129, 129
[hereinafter Solutions-Oriented Approach] ("Are clients well-served by their outside law firms? We think that
the answer is 'not very often,'because many of the incentives that law firms use to become (and stay) profitable
are at odds with their duties to their clients. As long as those perverse incentives exist, clients and their law
firms aren't actually on the same team.") (footnote omitted); Virtuous Billing, supra note 63, at 713 ("Billable
hours can provide some information about how 'productive' a lawyer is and how profitable her firm is - but, to
paraphrase Jane Austen, it is a truth universally acknowledged that when firms base their reward structures on
billable hour totals, they're encouraging billing abuse, which is a particularly virulent form of unethical
behavior.") (footnotes omitted). Not only are there disincentives for efficiency, see, e.g., Solutions-Oriented
Approach at 133 ("Billable hours also penalize the fast worker: the fast reader, the fast writer, the fast
thinker."), but also the description of work in time entries can often be less than illuminating. See, e.g., Legal
Analytics, supra note 30, at 1293-94 n.68 ("As one of us has said before (and as we both have thought,
repeatedly), 'attention to file' has never told a single client what the biller actually did.") (citing Lawyer
Behavior, supra note 63, at 86). Joe Tiano has suggested a good rubric for defining "value": "Clients receive
optimal value from lawyers when the legal team: (A) indispensably contributes towards a meaningful client
goal; (B) operates with peak staffing efficiency and workflow efficiency; and (C) alleviates a client's burdens."
Joseph Tiano, How Lawyers Demonstrate Their Value: A Proposed Analytic Framework, LINKEDIN (Apr. 17,
2017), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/how-lawyers-demonstrate-value-proposed-analytic-framework-tiano/
[hereinafter Demonstrate Value].
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D. The Problem With Using Billable Hours as a Measure of Value to the Client
Billable hours, of course, tell the client who did what and how long the "what"
took. 7 Some academics believe that an experienced inside counsel's review of a bill
will provide her with enough information to push back when the bill is too high. 8
Sometimes, that's true; sometimes, it's not.8 9 So much has been written about the pros
87 See generally Jonathan H. Choi, In Defense of the Billable Hour: A Monitoring Theory ofLaw Firm Fees,
70 S.C. L. REV. 297, 300-01 (2018) (discussing what billable hours describe). And UTBMS codes (that's the
Uniform Task Based Management System, https://utbms.com/) or LEDES files can go a long way towards
sorting through what work a law firm has done and gathering data on apples-to-apples comparisons.
88
The hourly bill conveys two main pieces of information to the in-house counsel. It
tells her the outside lawyer's hourly rate, and it tells her how the outside firm has spent
its time on a matter. The in-house counsel will have an idea of how much time a matter
should take, particularly if it is a routine issue and if she has contracted similar work to
the law firm before. As a result, she knows what range of charges is reasonable; often,
she will specify a ceiling on the number of hours that a law firm may spend on a matter
or require that the firm seek authorization before exceeding a certain spend. If she finds
the fees unreasonable, she can dispute them. Finally, if she feels the firm has failed to
work efficiently, she can simply refuse to hire it again on future matters.
Particularly in the modem, highly competitive legal market, corporate clients do not
hesitate to use all of the above tactics in order to extract the best deals from law firms.
For example, law firms are frequently forced to "write down" their final bills when clients
complain that the bills are unjustifiably high anticipating this, many firm partners will
also "write off" the hours of their associates even before submitting a bill to a client. In-
house counsel can effectively enforce discipline on its outside counsel by virtue of their
repeat relationship and the value of the corporation's business. Therefore, we should
discard any cartoonish vision of an impotent corporate counsel simply yielding to billing
abuses by law firms. In-house attorneys actively glean information from hourly bills and
use that information to direct the conduct of outside counsel.
Choi, supra note 87 (footnotes omitted); see also Michael Guihot, New Technology, the Death of the BigLaw
Monopoly and the Evolution of the Computer Professional, 20 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 405, 439-40 (2019)
(discussing the pressure that big-ticket clients, such as Microsoft, are placing on their outside law firms to
change from billing by the hour to alternative fee arrangements); Wilkins, supra note 79, at 2080 (discussing
the evolution from the one-line "for services rendered" bill to billing by the hours).
89 Professor Choi makes an interesting point, but I think that, under some circumstances, inside counsel has
far less leverage than one might think. See Answer Brief on the Merits at 30-31, Sheppard, Mullin, Richter &
Hampton LLP v. J-M Manufacturing Co., 425 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2018) (No. S232946) (rejecting the idea that
sophisticated inside counsel always have bargaining power that is superior to that of the law firms being hired).
And Larry Fox has this to say about inside counsel's relative sophistication:
First, all experienced or sophisticated clients are anything but powerful and
knowledgeable. Any practicing lawyer, even those at high-powered law firms, has
encountered many clients, long-time clients, clients who are voracious users of legal
services, clients who are titans of industry who nonetheless remain vulnerable and
without bargaining power in their relationship with counsel. How many times have
lawyers seen chief executive officer bravado so brazenly exercised within the corporate
enterprise disappear when the latest threat to corporate prosperity arises in the legal
arena? Often, these clients view "the law" as the ultimate black box and gratefully switch
from being independent warriors to accepting a dependent relationship with their lawyer;
indeed, a lawyer's professional stock in trade is to encourage trust among clients that will
make clients feel comfortable reposing these matters with lawyers. Lawyers should not
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and cons of billable hours (mostly cons) that I don't want to rehash that entire
discussion here. 9 0 1 just want to emphasize that even the firms that have objectively
reasonable billable rates still need to have a discussion with their clients, at the
beginning of the case, about what starts the clock running and what doesn't-and
whose clock should be starting and stopping for particular tasks.
My larger point, though, is that billable hours are an incomplete metric of value
and, thus, of reasonableness. The use of billable hours is reflected in the standards
that a bankruptcy judge uses to review the reasonableness of estate-paid
professionals,9' but billed time is not the only measure of value that a court could use
to determine reasonableness. 9 2 My gut hunch is that law firms-not financial advisors
or investment banks, which often are compensated in large chapter 11 cases with a
mix of flat monthly fees and success fees93-USe billable hours because they're afraid
that using anything else will cause them to underestimate the value of their work and
thus lose money.9 4 That's a presumption that could be cured with a good dose of legal
be in the business of being obliged to warn clients that one of the things they should be
alert to is possible (even likely) overreaching by their own lawyer.
Second, adding in-house counsel to the equation does not necessarily tip the
balance. The proponents of this experienced client notion might have the General
Counsel of General Motors in mind; yet, so often, in-house counsel, even in-house
counsel for Fortune 100 companies, are unsophisticated, young, and inexperienced. In
addition, there are thousands of smaller businesses that are represented by in-house
counsel, or even outside counsel, in their hiring of powerhouse firms, where that
counsel's presence does not right the power or information imbalance between lawyer
and client that the rules correctly assume.
Lawrence J. Fox, All's O.K. Between Consenting Adults: Enlightened Rule on Privacy, Obscene Rule on
Ethics, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 701, 721-22 (2001). Others disagree, having been on the receiving end of strong
client leverage and significant client sophistication.
90 See, e.g., Charles N. Geilich, Rich Alan, Poor Alan, Beggar Alan, Thief A History and Critique of the
Attorney Billable Hour, 5 CHARLESTON L. REV. 173, 189-90 (2011); Scott Turow, The Billable Hour Alust
Die, 93 A.B.A. J. 32, 34 (2007) ("[A]s a system, [billable hours] is a prison. When you are selling your time,
there are only three ways to make more money-higher rates, longer hours and more leverage."); Susan Saab
Fortney, Soul for Sale: An Empirical Study of Associate Satisfaction, Law Firm Culture, and the Effects of
Billable Hour Requirements, 69 UMKC L. REV. 239, 241 (2000) ("[C]ommentaries and study reports have
identified billing pressure as the key culprit for attorney dissatisfaction.").
91 See 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)-(4) (2012).
92 See id. § 328(a). There is a risk, though, that alternative measures that end up not reflecting value are
inextricably linked to section 328(a)'s "unforeseen and unforeseeable" standard. See supra note 21. The point,
though, is that no one has ever walked into a lawyer's office and said, "I think that 5,000 billable hours will
help me solve the problem that I have." People do walk into a lawyer's office and say, "Can you help me solve
this problem?" If we focus key performance indicators on how well the lawyer solves that problem, rather than
focusing on how much time that the law firm puts into solving that problem, we will realign the client's needs
with the value of the legal work.
93 See 11 U.S.C. § 328(a). Often, the orders appointing them will ask them to keep track of time in half-hour
increments, but those tracked hours aren't used to determine the compensation. See also infra notes 105-112
and accompanying text.
94 In a way, even when law firms are acknowledging all of the reasons that billable hours are bad, they keep
using them because as bad as they think billable hours are, they like the alternatives even less. Cf Winston
Churchill's famous statement "Indeed it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government
except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time ..... But Churchill may have been
quoting someone else, and the original source may have been lost to time. See Richard M. Langworth,
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analytics.9
Many good minds have thought of other ways to create metrics that reflect the
value of the services that a law firm provides. For example, DuPont's legal
department was able to reconceive the value proposition for hiring outside counsel:
What if PPP [profits per partner] were redefined as Productivity
Per Professional?
What would be the core questions asked of inside counsel in
moving toward the creation of this new metric?
* What are we buying? (Not hours!)
* What should the pieces cost?
* What factors determine value?
Making use of The Counsel Management Group's proprietary
litigation budget templates, DuPont Legal has introduced
"productivity" and "value" into financial and budget discussions with
outside counsel. The four key principles DuPont Legal adopted in
implementing value-based billing are:
* The company wants to pay for results, not time;
* The focus is on how well services are provided, not how long
it takes to provide them;
* The key expectations of both DuPont Legal and the outside
firm are clearly stated and addressed early in the negotiation
process; and
* The staffing and work processes are identified and adapted
to working in a value-based billing model.96
These four principles are one good way to restate what inside counsel should be
looking for in hiring their bankruptcy counsel, but there are many other ways. The
ACC Value Challenge has suggested certain metrics, some of which are also reflected
in the U.S. Trustee Guidelines: 97
Outside Counsel Performance Metrics:
* Rate of overall success in achieving client goals (e.g.,
tracking "wins" where possible, or resolution of matters
within expected parameters, or closing within a particular
"Democracy is the Worst Form of Government . . .", RICHARD M. LANGWORTH BLOG (June 26, 2009),
https://richardlangworth.com/worst-forn-of-government (emphasis omitted) (attributing the quote itself to an
"unknown predecessor").
95 See infra Part III. Legal analytics can, of course, also be misused. See E-mail from Dwayne Hermes to
author (July 29, 2019) (on file with author).
96 Thomas L. Sager, James L. Michalowicz & Gardner G. Courson, Litametrics: Analytics for Selecting Your
Dream Team, 31 No. 4 ACC DOCKET 68, 74 (May 2013) [hereinafterAnalytics for Selecting].
97 See Procedural Guidelines, supra note 9, at 36249 (including time spent, rates charged, necessity of
services, skill of the firm, and reasonable compensation as performance metrics of outside counsel).
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time period, etc.);
* Scores on qualitative measures assessed by in-house
counsel, evaluating items such as creativity, responsiveness,
efficiency, knowledge sharing, etc.;
* Financial metrics like the percent of matters for which a full
year budget was submitted on time;
* Percent of matters managed for which forecast updates were
submitted on time;
* Actual spending vs. budgeted spending, by matter;
* Comparative costs (what Law Firm A charges to produce a
particular piece of work vs. what Law Firm B charges);
* Average blended rate for all law firm lawyers who billed to
the client (i.e., divide total fees by number of hours billed,
for each matter and across all matters); and
* Other process goals (i.e., goals relating to the process by
which the work is completed), including timely completion
or submission of
* Monthly reports;
* Early case assessments; and
* After action reviews / lessons learned. 98
It is certainly possible to create a mix of metrics that includes billable time but also
adds other measures of value. 99 To create useful metrics, though, inside counsel and
outside bankruptcy counsel must be explicit in the goals of the representation and
must stay aware of the not-from-my-own-pocketbook dynamic that encourages over-
lawyering.
Not only can billable hours themselves be an inaccurate, or at best incomplete,
measure of value, but also the billable rates can be an imprecise description of a
professional's skill and experience. Hourly rates are moving ever-upward in the larger
98 ASS'N OF CORP. COUNSEL, MANAGING VALUE-BASED RELATIONSHIPS WITH OUTSIDE COUNSEL 9,
https://www.acc.com/resource-library/managing-value-based-relationships-outside-counsel (last updated
Aug. 25, 2011).
99
One solution is to supplant the use of billable hours with other, better metrics of
value. If one takes to heart Stephen Covey's Habit Number 2-"begin with the end in
mind"-it is possible to discuss with a client what constitutes a successful representation
and then calculate metrics that reflect that success. These metrics include average case
life, budget accuracy, evaluation accuracy and return on investment measures. When a
firm has a menu of metrics from which a client can choose to measure the value of the
firm's representation and when the firm works with the client to identify benchmarks for
those metrics, the relationship begins to look much more like a true partnership.
Solutions-OrientedApproach, supra note 86, at 134 (footnote omitted).
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chapter II cases. 00 Rates in some of the recent cases in which I reviewed fees were
north of $1,500/hour. In the most complex chapter 1 Is, or in chapter 1 Is that present
truly novel issues, it's entirely possible that some professionals are worth that rate.' 0'
Other professionals, though, are clearly tempted to match the rate that has widespread
market acceptance, even if they don't necessarily have the entire skill set to justify
that rate. 02 In addition to that anchoring effect, there is the issue of how often, and
when, the firms will raise their hourly rates and what rough magnitude of rate
increases is reasonable.1 03 My point is that just because someone wants to be worth
$1,500/hour or raise his rates 20% a year doesn't mean that he is worth that amount
or that increase.io4
100 Cf Clifford J. White III & Walter W. Theus, Jr., New Fee Guidelines Enhance Transparency and
Promote Market Forces in Billing, 32 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Aug. 2013 at 22, 22 ("[T]he most sophisticated
participants in the bankruptcy process say bankruptcy attorneys' costs are rising too rapidly . . . .").
101 Assuming that they are billing their time by employing the experience and analytical skills that earned
them that market rate (and not billing their time doing tasks that someone who has a lower hourly rate could
do just as well, such as reviewing a docket).
102
Anchoring bias can affect fee reviews by focusing on a professional's hourly rate as
a way of determining the quality of that professional. We've all seen the "rate creep" that
can go on in any sort of legal representation, where the client thinks that someone is
better simply because he bills at a higher rate. That rate anchors our perception of quality.
When a professional asks for a higher rate because other professionals in the case are
billing at rates greater than his, he's anchoring to that rate, rather than looking at all of
the credentials. And when professionals raise their rates in the middle of a case, they're
typically anchoring to their firm's hourly rate increases outside the bankruptcy
department. But the Bankruptcy Code asks for information about the reasonableness of
rates in light of "the nature, the extent, and the value of such services." Therefore, the
professionals shouldbe introducing evidence that links the increase in rates to an increase
in benefit to the estate. They should, but often, they don't.
Value Billing, supra note 2, at 136-37 (2012) (footnotes omitted); see also Professional Fees, supra note 76
("The top rates of the top lawyers at the most prestigious firms become the top rates of many practitioners with
less experience, expertise, and overhead. This leads to an inexorable rise in rates unrelated to the quality of
the services being rendered."); Legal Analytics, supra note 30, at 1277-81 (discussing some social science
explanations for high legal bills). For another example of why a particular number might not mean anything,
see THIS IS SPINAL TAP (Embassy Pictures Corp. 1984). Nigel Tufnel argues that his amplifier is "one louder"
because most other amplifiers have the number ten as the maximum on their dials, and his amplifier dial "goes
to eleven." See id. If the client doesn't question the rate-or negotiate it then perhaps the bankruptcy court,
before approving the rate structure, could ask the law firm to put on evidence that links experience and
analytical ability to rate structure.
103 In some of the bankruptcy cases in which I've been the fee examiner, I've seen some yearly increases in
the 2 0+% range, even when the national average is often in the 3-5% range. According to the Georgetown
Law Center for the Study of the Legal Profession, the average annual rate increase since 2009 has been 2-4 %.
See GEO. L. CTR. FOR THE STUD. OF THE LEGAL PROF., 2018 REPORT ON THE STATE OF THE LEGAL MARKET
13 (Thomson Reuters 2018), http://www.legalexecutiveinstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/2018-
Report-on-the-State-of-the-Legal-Market.pdf.
104
Clients can often mistake high fees for high quality. But not everyone who charges
high fees is consistently good, and not everyone who charges a relatively low fee is bad.
But there's a Lake Wobegon effect: we pay high fees for all of our professionals, and so
"all of our [lawyers] are strong, all of our [reorganization officers] are good-looking, and
all of our [advisors] are above average."
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E. Success Fees, Transaction Fees, and Other Ill-DefinedMetrics that Get Triggered
Later in a Case
If measuring results by counting billable hours is an imprecise measure of value,
are success fees or transaction fees better metrics? Not necessarily. As with most
things involving legal drafting, precise definitions are key. To get a feel for how such
fees might be defined, In re John Q. Hammons Fall 2006, LLC, is illustrative:
UBS requests payment of a Restructuring Transaction Fee and a
Sale Transaction Fee. Under the terms of the Agreement,
those fees are due upon "consummation" of a Restructuring
Transaction and a Sale Transaction, respectively. The Agreement
defines "Restructuring Transaction" and "Sale Transaction":
As used in this Agreement, the term "Restructuring
Transaction") means, whether effected directly or indirectly by the
Company and/or through an affiliate and/or a subsidiary, any
restructuring, reorganization, rescheduling, refinancing or
recapitalization or the Company's (or any other Debtors or any of
their respective subsidiaries) liabilities, including contingent
liabilities (whether on or off balance sheet), whether through a plan
of reorganization or liquidation, a comprehensive settlement
arrangement, including with respect to any material litigation, an
exchange, consent solicitation, repurchase, or repayment of any such
liabilities, or any modification, amendment, deferral, forgiveness,
restructuring, recapitalization, rescheduling, moratorium, or
adjustment of the terms and/or conditions of any such liabilities.
As used in this Agreement, the term "Sale Transaction" means
in one transaction or a series of transactions or potential transactions:
... the marketing for, and the sale, transfer or other disposition
of any portion of the capital stock or assets of the Company, any
other Debtor or any of their respective subsidiaries by way of a
tender or exchange offer, option, negotiated purchase, leveraged
In the highly competitive world of Chapter 11 representation, there are some
professionals who are truly "name brands," and whose skill levels are high enough to
justify their fees. Others, who may be quite good, haven't yet broken into the ranks of the
nationally known, and it may be more difficult for them to get the highest-profile cases.
Considering that people are choosing their professionals at a time when delay can be
prejudicial to parties' rights, it's no surprise that the first professionals tapped are the best-
known ones. The fact is, though, that even the best professionals can't be at the top of
their game all of the time. Unfortunately, there's no fix for the link in clients' minds
between high fees and high quality, other than to have some awareness that the
relationship between fees and skill isn't linear.
Rethinking Fees, supra note 5, at 285 (footnotes omitted). Cf WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HENRY V, Act 4,
Scene 1 (conversation between Gower and Fluellen about coxcombs).
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buyout, lease or license, minority investment or partnership, joint or
collaborative venture or otherwise . . . .o
If you developed a suspicion that these definitions were so expansive so as to include
almost any activity in which the advisor had participated, I wouldn't disagree with
you.' 0 6 The definitions of these types of fees typically are broad and are often
approved under section 328(a), which incorporates that higher "approved unless
improvident under unforeseen and unforeseeable conditions" standard.' 0 7  The
advantage of not using a billable hour calculation for these types of fees is that the
calculation of those fees is supposed to relate directly to results, rather than to time
spent.'0 8 In some cases, though, the contribution of the professional to the result
1o5 In re John Q. Hammons Fall 2006, LLC, 600 B.R. 436,444-45 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2019) (footnotes omitted)
(emphasis in original); see also id. at 446 ("Because UBS is entitled to all fees and expenses under the
Agreement regardless of what 'success fee' means, the Approval Order's use of the ambiguous term
'success fee' does not limit, or introduce any ambiguity into, the term 'Sale Transaction."') (footnote omitted).
106 In Hammons, the bankruptcy court calculated the restructuring transaction fee at $7 million and took the
calculation of the sale transaction under advisement, but observed that,
[t]hese amounts may be recalculated after Debtors' remaining assets are sold, bearing in
mind that all transactions shall be considered part of a single Sale Transaction in
calculating the Sale Transaction Fee. Per the Agreement, this Fee shall be offset dollar-
for-dollar by the Restructuring Transaction Fee and by 50% of any Monthly
Advisory Fees paid to UBS in excess of $ 1,050,000.
Id. at 447-48 (footnotes omitted).
107 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. Section 328(a)'s standard, when applied to engagements with
very broad definitions of "transaction" or "success," might put a bankruptcy court in the situation of having to
award such fees even when the professional was not particularly helpful at all. See In re Mirant Corp., 354
B.R. 113 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006). In that case, the court observed:
Had the financial advisors perceived the significance of the changing gas price
environment, they would have recognized that their valuations were too low. Had they
advised their constituencies of this, the parties might have negotiated a consensual plan
earlier. Had the Plan been agreed to earlier, substantial costs and time would have been
saved. Put another way, at the one point in these cases when the financial advisors
occupied center stage, they failed to predict Debtors' value anywhere near correctly,
persisted in stubbornly defending erroneous values and, thus, contributed to the need for
a much longer, more expensive valuation and negotiation process than was necessary. As
it was, the gross underestimation of Debtors' value encouraged in some of the statutory
fiduciaries a recalcitrance in negotiation that delayed Debtors' emergence from chapter
11 and added substantially to the cost of Debtors' reorganization.
Id. at 130 (footnotes omitted).
108 See In re Residential Capital, LLC, 504 B.R. 358, 370 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014) ("Instead, the standard of
review for a success (or . . . a 'transaction') fee is: (1) whether the services were necessary and beneficial to
the estates at the time they were rendered, and (2) whether the success fee is reasonable based on the market.
In fact, with regard to 'time spent,' Judge Gonzalez noted that '[u]nder a section 330(a) examination, the time
spent may shed little light on the actual value that a financial advisor brought to a transaction, it is more the
financial advisor's access to market opportunities and the results it achieved that warrant its compensation.')
(alterations in original) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted) (quoting In re Intelogic Trace, Inc., 188 B.R.
557, 559 n.9 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1995)); see also In re Relativity Fashion, LLC, No. 15-11989, 2016 WL
8607005, *3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016) ("[Transaction] fees usually are contingent on the consummation of a
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obtained is tangential at best.109 The transaction or success fees approved
prospectively under section 328(a) might not reflect value at all, but they aren't likely
to be reduced. The lesson here is not that all transaction fees or success fees are bad
or even suspicious, but that their definitions are critical and that approving those fees
in advance as part of an employment application linked to section 328(a) carries
significant risks."10 If virtually every investment bank, chief reorganization officer,
or financial advisor wants broadly defined success fees or transaction fees, though,
and insists on having those fees approved in advance under section 328(a), it is
difficult to imagine debtors in possession or creditors' committees that will have
sufficient leverage to force more reasonable and precise terms."' The lack of
leverage, coupled with an understandable lack of experience in complex
bankruptcies, explains part of why so many companies are reluctant to push back on
some of the terms of engagement that bankruptcy professionals request-and why so
few parties in interest review the fee applications filed in a case. But there is one
transaction so that they are not paid if a transaction does not occur. But apart from that condition, they often
have no other requirements. They often merely require that the transaction occur with no other conditions
whatsoever."); In re XO Comm., Inc., 398 B.R. 106, 116 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("In determining
the reasonableness of a transaction or success fee, in the absence of an actual determination prior to or at the
time that the services were rendered of what the marketplace would bear, the court must look at the nexus
between what was achieved, i.e., the restructuring of the debt, and the impact of the advisor's effort in that
regard.").
109 In re Mirant again provides an illustrative example:
Perhaps because of the nature of fee arrangements for structuring transactions outside of
bankruptcy, however, many financial advisors insist in a chapter 11 case on tying their
compensation to a "successful" outcome of the case. This, in turn, suggests that the efforts
of a financial advisor should be measured, if not in lodestar fashion, then by the
contributions of the advisor to the successful outcome of the case. Logically, this means
a financial advisor's compensation should be based on the advisor's part in bringing about
a successful result. Certainly in the case at bar this court cannot find that the Debtors'
estate and its constituencies received direct benefit commensurate with the fees now to
be paid to some of the financial advisors.
In re Mirant Corp., 354 B.R. 113, 128-29 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006) (footnote omitted).
110 See id. at 13 1 ("Nevertheless, the court cannot find that the terms of employment of the financial advisors
have proven to be 'improvident' (Code § 328(a)); the court must therefore honor those terms.") (footnote
omitted). InIn re Airant, the bankruptcy court observed that, perhaps, the financial advisors might have agreed
to a standard section 327 appointment, followed by a normal section 330 review. Id. at 128 ("The court erred
seriously in entering orders which left it so little discretion in assessing the work of the financial advisors.
Though the court was given to understand Debtors and the Committees could not obtain competent financial
advisors without assurance that there would be substantial 'success' bonuses, whether or not each advisor could
show it had earned such a fee, the court has since learned that some financial advisors, at least, will accept
more conventional arrangements in terms of compensation. In the future, the court hopes and expects that
parties in large chapter 11 cases in this and other districts will seek out financial advisors that are willing to
have their work judged on a basis similar to the rules applied to other professionals.") (footnotes omitted).
111 Cf supra note 89 (noting corporate counsel might have less leverage in situations in which virtually every
professional has take-it-or-leave-it terms of employment).
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more dynamic at play: the fear that objecting to some other professionals' fees will
have negative consequences for one's own fees.112
F. Fear ofRocking the Boat
As Professor Matthew Bruckner observes:
At least three reasons may explain the limited participation in chapter
1I's fee control system. First, objections are expensive to prepare and
prosecute. Even worse, these costs are bome by the objecting party,
but successful objections do not necessarily inure to their benefit.
Second, parties may be concerned that an objection will derail
unrelated negotiations. Third, some have alleged that a "conspiracy
of silence" exists among bankruptcy professionals. In short, this third
reason argues that the existence of repeat players in corporate
bankruptcy cases creates incentives that span individual cases,
encouraging parties-in-interest (and their professionals) not to object
to each other's fees in any one particular case because of concerns
about future retribution.113
It's interesting, though: parties in interest often want their own professionals
appointed so that their professionals can critique the work of every other
professional, 4 but they don't seem to want to object to these other professionals' fees.
On this point, I agree with Professor Bruckner's observation that significant barriers
prevent parties in interest from spending the time and the money to scrutinize, and
object to, the fees in a large chapter 11 case.
112
Add to this issue of not "seeing" the bills accurately the human tendency to think
"there but for the grace of [insert your preferred deity here] go I." That "there but for the
grace" mentality contributes to a reluctance to object to fee applications on the part of
lawyers whose fee applications look remarkably similar to one's own. If one firm sends
five professionals to do the job of one or two, is that firm really going to object to another
firm that also tends to overstaff matters? Sometimes, sure; but often, no.
Rethinking Fees, supra note 5, at 279. Or, as Joe Tiano has pointed out: "One professional group challenging
another professional group's fees may find itself on the receiving end of such an assessment later. This dynamic
seems to make challenging unreasonable fees a less than rigorous effort." Comments from Joe Tiano to author
on an earlier draft (on file with author).
113 Crowdsourcing, supra note 5, at 370-71 (footnotes omitted). But cf supra note 33.
114 Cf Michelle M. Harner, Trends in Distressed Debt Investing: An Empirical Study of Investors'
Objectives, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 69, 108 (2008) (exploring the possibility of a neutral fiduciary
representing the bankruptcy estate); see also Michelle M. Harner, The Potential Value ofDynamic Tension in
Restructuring Negotiations, 30 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2011 at 1, 63 ("Of [148] cases, 98 (68.5 percent)
involved multiple lawyers and financial advisers. The retention of a financial adviser did not significantly
impact the returns to unsecured creditors or the likelihood of the debtor reorganizing.") (footnotes omitted).
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All of these dynamics"5. add up to some rational-albeit frustrating-reasons that
chapter 11 fees are difficult to monitor. We all have our stories to tell. Mine include
the following:
* Tracking the number of people appearing at a valuation hearing
that lasted approximately one month to see how many of those
appearing in court had active roles;
* Asking a professional why he billed over 30 hours for an eight-
page stay relief motion;
* Being deposed for approximately 30 minutes because I had
objected to a professional's expenses (he expensed a shirt
because he had to stay overnight);" 6
* Reminding a professional whose local office consisted only of
115
The problem with monitoring estate-paid fees in larger Chapter 11 cases is that the
pressure to represent fiduciaries well tends to generate additional work and overstaffing,
and the bankruptcy court can easily be overwhelmed with the task of reviewing those
fees. Moreover, the clients of those professionals, who normally might be able to provide
input to the court about the reasonableness of those fees, may not have the knowledge
base to supply useful information. It's the interaction of these several factors that causes
fees in some cases to be unreasonable:
(1) the disconnect between the professionals doing the work and the clients
receiving the bills, caused by the fact that no client will have to pay 100% of the
fees and expenses on those bills;
(2) the fear of dropping the ball when representing a fiduciary;
(3) the fact that relatively few of these client-fiduciaries themselves are repeat
players in the bankruptcy system, and the matters being billed may be quite puzzling
to them;
(4) a deep distrust of the work done by other parties' professionals, so that each
constituency wants to hire its own professionals;
(5) a reluctance on the part of any professional to micromanage other
professionals' decisions by filing objections to fees; and
(6) a tendency to want to choose "name brand" professionals, rather than less
well-known professionals, so that the choice won't be second-guessed later.
Rethinking Fees, supra note 5, at 285-86 (footnote omitted).
116
I remember to this day a particularly obvious error in a case in which I had been the
court-appointed fee expert. One lawyer had charged the estate for a $140 shirt. His
rationale was that he'd had to stay overnight unexpectedly and needed a shirt, and that
therefore the bankruptcy estate should reimburse him. Setting aside who should own that
shirt if the estate was paying for it, shouldn't the estate get the shirt?-the expense was
miniscule when compared to the total fees and expenses paid in that case. But I seethed
over it, because the arrogance of charging the estate for the shirt was as symbolic as it
was real. If a lawyer thought that the estate owed him for a shirt, to what other expenses
was this lawyer "entitled"? In another case, we uncovered an attorney who was routinely
generous in tips for restaurant meals-at a consistent rate of well over 20%. It's easy to
be generous when the funds for the generosity don't come out of your own pocket.
Id. at 279-80 (footnote omitted).
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partners that assigning low-level work to those partners was
unreasonable;
* Raising with a professional my objection to its increased hourly
rates, because the appointment of that professional had taken
place a mere five weeks before and there had been no indication
in the application for employment that a rate increase was
imminent; and
* Arguing about an almost 100% overlap in the work of two
partners in the same firm, both of whom did identical work,
because the client was more comfortable with having two
partners looking out for its interests, instead of just one.
Those are just some of the ones that I've experienced. Joe Tiano, my co-author on
several articles," 7 noted some more:
1. A timekeeper with 1004 time entries recorded 808 of them
in . . .one-tenth hour (0.1) increments[,] often ten or twenty times in
a single day[,] for the task of reading a one-paragraph court order,
reading an e-mail[,] or leaving a voice message. Playing within the
rules of the game, but gaming the system.
2. On an international arbitration, a partner at a top 10 law firm
recorded 153 line[-]item entries. 150 of 153 were in a round[-]hour
(1.0, 2.0[,] etc ... ) ... Then[,] to make matters worse, her narrative
entries were a copy[-]and[-]paste job with 10, 12, 15 narratives ....
3. On a single day, a patent prosecution paralegal billed 0.2 hour
time entries to 47 different matter numbers/files (one file for each
patent) to notify the PTO of an address change of the patent ...
registrant."'
Outside of the world of large chapter 11 cases, perhaps a client would scrutinize bills
peppered with these hinky artifacts and ask for reductions.119 Inside large chapter 1 Is,
117 Nancy B. Rapoport & Joseph R. Tiano, Jr., Leveraging Legal Analytics and Spend Data as a Law Firm
Self-Governance Tool, XIII J. BUS., ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 71 (2019); LegalAnalytics, supra note 30.
118 E-mail from Joe Tiano to author (July 28, 2019) (on file with author).
119
It is true that the role and function of in-house counsel has been completely
transformed over the last three decades or so, shifting from second-class legal actors who
assist outside counsel to powerful actors who direct and supervise the work of large law
firm lawyers. As in-house counsel grew in sophistication, prestige and influence, they
indeed developed the capacity to question the advice, representation, and fees of Big
Law. It is also true that in-house counsel increasingly used this newfound power to
question and sometimes break up long-standing relationships between corporate clients
and Big Law; divide work that once went to Big Law to various components that now go
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though, it would be helpful if fee examiners and the United States Trustee were not
the only ones raising these types of issues. Clients need to take more control, and the
benefit of taking more control will likely surpass the costs.
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR INSIDE COUNSEL
There are several categories of controls that inside counsel could consider in
order to monitor bankruptcy fees and expenses.1 2 0 Some of them involve decisions
about which professionals to hire; others involve setting ground rules at the onset of
representation (and enforcing those ground rules throughout the case); and still others
involve taking advantage of new technology.
A. Think Hard About Which Professionals to Hire
1. When to Hire "Bet the Company" Counsel and When to Divvy up Tasks Across a
Variety of Different Counsel
My sense is that inside counsel generally do a good job of deciding what to
"make" (what work to keep in-house) and what to "buy" (what work to give to outside
counsel).121 But when they deal with a bankruptcy, they tend to buy virtually all of
to different law firms, thus reducing the ability of rainmakers to refer work to other
partners at their firms; negotiate lower, more creative fee arrangements; and even
micromanage Big Law staffing and cost decisions.
All of this, however, suggests a power shift from Big Law to corporate clients, not
the Death of Big Law.
Russell G. Pearce & Eli Wald, The Relational Infrastructure of Law Firm Culture and Regulation: The
Exaggerated Death ofBig Law, 42 HOFSTRAL. REV. 109, 119 (2013) (footnotes omitted). Professors Pearce
and Wald go on to suggest that "the days of unscrutinized Big Law fee statements for 'services rendered' are
gone, powerful in-house counsel are here to stay, and the asymmetry in legal information that once
characterized the relationship between Big Law and their clients is much reduced." Id. at 120. That may be
true in most types of work that inside counsel pass along to outside counsel, but my own experience leads me
to conclude that the information asymmetry is alive and well in chapter 11 cases.
120 See Bankruptcy Counsel, supra note 34, at 400-01 (discussing different factors that may influence the
choice of counsel).
121 As an example, look at how DuPont Legal began to think about its outside counsel:
When DuPont Legal embarked on creating a new model for managing litigation,
one of the first steps was to perform a needs assessment. The total litigation portfolio was
divided into four groups based on levels of impact.
* "Brain surgery,"
* Specialty litigation,
* Product liability/personal injury, and
* Commodities.
The conclusion was that the greater percentage of the litigation portfolio resided in
levels three and four, and for these cases, simple, efficient legal services were required.
High-impact cases required higher-impact firms, and firms without the high price tag
could handle low-impact cases effectively.
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their services from a large firm.1 2 2 There are many things that a large firm can do
well. Whether a company is choosing counsel to take it through chapter 11 or a
company finds itself a member of an official committee, taking a moment to decide
if a large firm is the right choice is important. Sometimes, the magnitude or
complexity of a case necessitates a heavily-staffed firm, but sometimes, a well-run
regional firm can likely do the job as well, and for less cost.1 23 Moreover,
A common mistake made by law departments is following the "always assign the
best lawyers to my cases" selection method. This often translates into hiring the most
expensive lawyers or law firm for any given matter. Doing so makes sense to the degree
that inside litigation counsel want the best protection in defending complex cases on their
particular docket. The fear is that any case could go bad and expose both the inside
counsel and the company. Unfortunately, there is another consequence from this type of
behavior-spending more than what the value of the portfolio warrants; in other words,
treating every case as a "bet the company" case. The analogy can be made to professional
football teams that overspend on high-priced, big-name free agent players. Spending
money for a team of all high-priced talent does not necessarily translate to wins on the
playing field or in the courtroom.
Analytics for Selecting, supra note 96, at 71-72.
122 See Bankruptcy Counsel, supra note 34 and accompanying text. Of course, they'll have special counsel
for certain tasks and ordinary-course counsel for other tasks, but they'll likely choose a large firm as lead
counsel.
123 See, e.g., Value Billing, supra note 2, at 164-65 (suggesting sometimes regional firms can "do very good
work, too, at much less expense"). Here are some considerations that inside counsel could use:
New Models are benefitting from these trends in several different ways, making in-
roads on Big Law practices in five distinct ways. First, while Big Law still controls legal
matters that require very large teams, or teams that span many different practice areas,
Virtual Law Firms such as Rimon, VLP Partners LLP, and Potomac Law Group, and
Virtual Law Companies such as Berger Legal LLC and Cognition LLP, and Innovative
Law Finns such as GLA Law Partners and Summit Law Group compete successfully for
a wide range of matters that may require high-level expertise but involve only one or a
few seasoned lawyers.
Second, boutique firms are challenging Big Law's commanding market lead in
specific practice areas. Boutique firms' models that compete with Big Law in specific
practice areas include Landmark Law Group (real estate), Smithline PC (tech
transactions and IP licensing), Miller Law Group (defense-side employment law), Tucker
Ellis, LLP and Bartlit Beck Herman Palenchar & Scott (trial work), Valorem Law Group
(complex litigation), and The California Appellate Group (appellate).
Third, Secondment Firms handle overflow from in-house legal departments and
part-time in-house counsel work that might otherwise go to Big Law. This includes
Canadian Delgatus Legal Services, Inc., which provides temporary lawyers to fill in for
lawyers on their long maternity leaves.
Fourth, relatively routine legal work is migrating to the lowest-cost providers. The
behemoth of "legal process outsourcing" is Axiom, which has commodified large
companies' contracting and certain litigation functions. Also in this arena are: Counsel
on Call (which does e-discovery, contract review and abstraction, and other managed
services), Raymond Law Group (which specializes in price-sensitive commodity
(litigation) work, The General Counsel, Limited (which sometimes handles all of a
company's employment law matters or a different type of work for a fixed fee), and
d'Arcambal Ousley & Cuyler Burk (which often handles all of a company's routine
insurance work).
Fifth, other New Models target mid-market companies that have been priced out by
2020] 73
ABILAWREVIEW
disaggregating the services-meaning that some services stay with the main
bankruptcy counsel and others go to smaller firms-can be an efficient way of
managing the many tasks that chapter 11 demands. (That's why the Guidelines 24
specifically mention "efficiency counsel.")1 25 Disaggregation is likely to continue
outside of bankruptcy, given inside counsel's need to monitor their "legal spend"
carefully,1 26 and it should occur inside large chapter 11 cases more often.
2. If At All Possible, Slow Down and Negotiate
Whether choosing a large law firm, a smaller one, or a set of firms, both large
and small, negotiating the engagement letter is key. When there is no true emergency
necessitating an immediate filing, inside counsel should try to negotiate not just the
rates and the staffing of the matter, but also when certain types of work, such as
document production, should be outsourced.1 27 Most debtors plan for a chapter 11
the steep rise in Big Law rates. Examples are The Mitzel Group, LLP; Phillips & Reiter,
PLLC; InnovaCounsel, LLP; Avdkka; The General Counsel, Limited; Exemplar
Companies, Inc.; and Burton Law, LLC. Some of these firms target large companies as
well.
All this adds up to a sobering picture that helps explain why Big Law's book of
business is no longer growing by leaps and bounds.
Disruptive Innovation, supra note 40, at 6-7 (footnotes omitted).
124 See Procedural Guidelines, supra note 9.
125
Secondary counsel may be either "efficiency counsel" or "conflicts counsel." Efficiency
counsel is secondary counsel employed to handle more routine and "commoditized"
work, such as claims objections and avoidance actions, at lower cost to the estate than
lead bankruptcy counsel. Conflicts counsel is secondary counsel employed when lead
bankruptcy counsel is subject to a limited, not pervasive, conflict of interest that prevents
it from performing some small part of its duties.
Id. at 36256.
126 Cf Bernard A. Burk & David McGowan, Big But Brittle: Economic Perspectives on the Future of the
Law Firm in the New Economy, 2011 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1, 93 (predicting a future involving increased
disaggregation of services).
127
Every fee application lists the professionals and their regular billing rates. No doubt these
are the rates that the firms would like to charge their clients. But there is an entire body
of literature and substantial evidence showing how corporate counsel can and do
negotiate with outside counsel to lower the cost of representation. Negotiations can cover
topics ranging from rates to staffing. For instance, a company engaging a major law firm
to represent it in "bet the company" litigation might not blanch at paying the full rates of
the firm's top partners but might insist that it will not pay first and second year associates
$400 per hour to review documents.
We suspect that a corporate client's regular practices on negotiating and controlling
professional fees outside of bankruptcy often break down when retaining reorganization
professionals. Such a breakdown can be attributed to a number of causes. A potential
debtor is not in a strong negotiating posture when engaging bankruptcy counsel. If every
large firm is quoting essentially the same fee structure, deciding who to retain will likely
turn on factors other than fees. This is particularly true where the debtor will not have
post-confirmation operations that would benefit from lower fees.
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filing. The real crunch, actually, may be in securing representation for the committee
in a timely fashion,1 28 but there, too, the members of the committee should have a
checklist of negotiating points to cover when interviewing potential counsel .129 That
checklist could include:
* Whether the firm would consider an alternative fee structure 30
or a blended fee structure (part billable hours and part flat-rate
or contingency fee);131
* Whether this particular case should be subject to a fee cap 32 and
under what circumstances that cap could be adjusted upward;
Professional Fees, supra note 76 (footnote omitted).
128
The creditors' committee is in a slightly different posture than the debtor. The
committee's constituency stands to lose if professional fees are exorbitant. We understand
that firms often discuss fees when seeking to represent the creditor's committee at the so-
called "beauty contest." Although a law firm might offer the committee a "deal," it might
not be the best deal available. But the committee is often under extreme pressure to
engage counsel and other professionals quickly in a major case. The committee has often
just been formed, so the members might very well not know each other at all. This hardly
sets the stage for a fruitful negotiation.
Id. (footnote omitted).
129 I've made this checklist suggestion before, in a somewhat different (but related) context. See, e.g., Lawyer
Behavior, supra note 63, at 78-80.
130
The number of different fee arrangements is limited only by the imagination. Of
course, the standard time-based billing, flat fees, and contingent fees are the most
common arrangements. However, professionals should be cognizant that these type of
fee arrangements are not the only thing that section 328 can be used to establish. Time
of payment, frequency of payments, amount of each payment, frequency of applications,
and hourly rates of professionals are only a few of the variables section 328 can establish
at the beginning of representation.
Robert J. Landry, III & James R. Higdon, A Primer on ]] U.S.C § 328(a) and its Use in Alternative Billing
Aethods in Bankruptcy, 50 MERCER L. REV. 537, 557 (1999).
131
The bankruptcy bar and its clients could learn from the experience of other lawyers and
clients who have seen the benefits of projects like the ACC Value Challenge, especially
because the distressed company practice already encourages innovation. There is
opportunity through the study of the various types of alternative billing arrangements that
are part of value challenge so that, just like particular tasks can be matched with the
appropriate professional, clients can also choose the most appropriate fee structure for a
bankruptcy engagement by leveraging the billing experiences of others.
Value Added, supra note 35, at 84; see also Value Billing, supra note 2, at 141-42 (discussing rolling flat fees
or other alternative fee structures).
132 Some fee caps can result in significant savings. See, e.g., Joan Verdon, Lawyers Biggest Winners In Toys
'R' Us Bankruptcy, Top Firm Gets $56 Million, FORBES (June 14, 2019) ("According to the court documents,
that appears to be true for the lawyers as well. Kirkland & Ellis exceeded a fee cap for part of its work, and
agreed to reduce its fee by $11 million."). But see cases cited supra note 24, for a discussion of how
complicated fee caps can be.
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* What the budget should be for the typical components of any
large chapter 11 case (with the understanding that those budgets
will have to be adjusted as a given case plays out, but with the
equal understanding that any adjustments should occur after
discussions with the client and with client consent);' 33
* Whether the firm has (and uses) research banks for basic
bankruptcy issues that will be plugged into various pleadings;
* Whether the firm is making good use of artificial intelligence
aids generally, and under what circumstances;
* Which tasks would be done by the primary bankruptcy counsel
and which tasks would be outsourced to a less-expensive
provider (including, perhaps, the use of artificial intelligence for
more than just document production);
* Whether the firm would agree to using a set of specific
professionals for the engagement and only add or substitute
different professionals with advance client consent;
* How the firm would staff various types of meetings and hearings
(how many people, what level of experience each professional
should have, and whether the firm would agree to limiting all-
hands-on-deck meetings and hearings to certain types of events
in a case);
* How many professionals will review certain types of work
product before that work product is finalized;
* How the firm would determine which matters would go to
efficiency counsel or local counsel and how much monitoring of
a case the main counsel, efficiency counsel, and local counsel
would be doing;
133 Remember, these law firms are pitching their services by touting how experienced they are in numerous
complex chapter 11 cases. If they use legal analytics properly, they can tell a prospective client not only what,
on average, certain components of a case will probably cost but also what the likely range will be, under certain
assumptions. As Timothy Corcoran has pointed out:
Many in-house counsel report that a well-crafted project plan and an accompanying
matter budget are critical to managing expectations with business leaders. Yet, law firms
tend to resist such requirements, believing that the ebb and flow of complex matters, and
certainly the outcomes, are beyond their control. While this is true to some extent, reports
Banks, experienced lawyers can still provide directional guidance based on deep
experience: "If you're using a law firm that holds itself out to be an expert in a certain
area of law, you expect them to provide a budget for a matter. What most in-house
lawyers are looking for is a budget that gives an order of magnitude. Is this going to take
10 hours or 50 hours or 200 hours?" For law firm partners who fear encroachment from
low-priced competitors, budgets based on a nuanced understanding of the various
decision trees involved in a complex case can clearly differentiate subject matter
expertise from those eager to win on price alone.
Corcoran, supra note 81, at 47-48; see also discussion infra Part III(C)(1) (regarding the use of legal analytics).
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* When and how the firm uses "transitory" or "itinerant"
professionals (professionals who are brought into the case in
medias res) and whether there is a discount for using
professionals who work on a case for, say, only ten or fewer
hours a month; 3 4 and
* How often the firm increases its hourly rates, and whether the
firm would be willing to institute caps in terms of the frequency
of increases and the percentage of increases.
There are other items that might go into a checklist, but having a conversation with
potential outside firms sets a tone that indicates that the client will be watching the
bills to look for efficiency in services.
B. Set Up the Rules of Engagement (and Enforce Them)
During the negotiation of an engagement letter, inside counsel should establish
the ground rules to ensure that everyone is on the same page. Inside counsel could,
for example, clarify how often bankruptcy counsel will communicate the status of the
case and the preferred method of communication. Inside counsel could also set
certain triggers for various expected high-cost activities that would require additional
discussion and advance consent, as well as set the standards for who 35 should be
physically present at a hearing or meeting, rather than being present by telephone or
briefed later. One might think that these conversations would be overkill; after all,
bankruptcy professionals are bringing an expertise to the table that the client itself
probably doesn't have, and that expertise includes judgment calls about staffing and
workload. A failure to have those conversations, though, ignores the dynamics of
estate-paid fees that can lead to taking every possible action, not just the reasonable
ones. Setting ground rules is prudent, and enforcing them is crucial. I have some
suggestions for those ground rules.
1. Create the Ground Rules for Billing
134 "In medias res" means "in the midst of things." See, e.g., In res media, ENCYC. BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/art/in-medias-res-literature (last visited Dec. 31, 2019). Transitory or itinerant
professionals are brought in for many reasons: someone who was working on the case has left the firm or is
out of the office for an extended time; the firm needs more hands on deck for an immediate need; or none of
the regular professionals is available. But coming up to speed comes at a cost. See, e.g., Laura Johnson,
Howard Tollin, Marci Waterman & Sarah Mills-Dirlam, Establishing Best Billing Practices Through Billing
Guidelines: Fostering Trust and Transparency on Legal Costs, 39 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 1, 14 (2016)
[hereinafter Best Billing Practices] ("Even when an attorney has significant experience, there may still be a
learning curve where he or she begins work on a case that is already in progress. A fee award may thereafter
be reduced if excessive hours are billed for that attorney to learn the details of the case or of the area of law.")
(footnote omitted).
135 For example, should both main counsel and local counsel attend every hearing? What if the matter is
likely to be uncontested?
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Even billing in tenths of an hour can become complicated if the ground rules
aren't clear: Under what circumstances does the clock start and stop?13 6 How detailed
should the time entries be, in order to avoid "block-billing" too many tasks
together? 3 7 How will bankruptcy counsel determine that its professionals are
avoiding the rounded-hour phenomenon, in which a statistically significant
percentage of time entries end in .1, .5, or x.0? Who in the bankruptcy group will
train the non-bankruptcy professionals about the intricacies of bankruptcy fee
applications and the need for clear time entries? Will the firm write off its time spent
in fixing non-compliant time entries? 3 8 In terms of the time entries' descriptions, how
specific should they be in order to comply with section 330's reasonableness
requirement?' 39 Specifying the billing rules at the beginning of the engagement
avoids the frustration that bankruptcy counsel will experience if they have to write
off a significant amount of time later.
2. Pay Attention to Staffing and Workflow Issues
Developing standards for good billing is important, but far more important is
setting standards for how particular tasks are staffed and how workflow is
managed.1 40 For example, there may be a need for regular, short all-hands-on-deck
136
[W]hen does the clock start and stop? What's the minimum billing increment? What
happens when the minimum billing increment is still too large to use for a very short task,
such as the gap between leaving a thirty-second message and a minimum 0.1-hourbilling
increment? Is thinking about the client while getting a cup of coffee billable time? If a
lawyer spends an hour thinking about the right strategy for a matter, can the lawyer write
"thinking" as the billing description?
Virtuous Billing, supra note 63, at 719-20 (footnotes omitted).
137 We fee reviewers do searches for "X and Y" entries- "review and file," "prepare for and attend," and so
on. When "and" entries are lumped together, rest assured that we will ask about them. And we won't be the
only ones asking. The United States Trustee's Guidelines are clear here:
Block billing or lumping: Whether the entries in the application are recorded in
increments of .1 of an hour and whether discrete tasks are recorded separately. The
United States Trustee will object to block billing or lumping. Each timekeeper, however,
may record one daily entry that combines tasks for a particular project that total a de
minimis amount of time if those tasks do not exceed .5 hours on that day.
Procedural Guidelines, supra note 9, at 36250.
138 If the firm doesn't write off that time before submitting a fee application, rest assured that both the Office
of the United States Trustee and the fee examiner will spot it and ask questions.
139 Not only are vague time entries (e.g., "attend to file") hard to parse generally, but they're also hard to
parse for section 330's reasonableness requirement. Cf Procedural Guidelines, supra note 9, at 36250 ("The
United States Trustee may object to vague or repetitive entries that are otherwise unjustified. Phrases like
'attention to' or 'review file,' without greater specificity or more detail, are generally insufficient.").
140 See, e.g., Best Billing Practices, supra note 134, at 8 ("There are two main categories of overstaffing
where it is inappropriate to bill to a client: (1) the use of multiple attorneys to staff routine conferences,
depositions, and hearings, and (2) the use of excessive numbers of professionals to complete basic legal
tasks.").
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meetings to ensure that everyone knows what's going on in the case. Having those
meetings may be faster and less costly than sending out email updates to a laundry
list of people, all of whom may have specific questions that are better addressed in
person.' 4 ' But all of us have been in meetings in which our presence is symbolic,
rather than useful. Bankruptcy professionals billing by the hour should be able to
distinguish between the first, efficient type of meeting and the second type. Likewise,
the number of people at a hearing should be monitored closely. Bringing several
paralegals, associates, of counsel, and partners to a hearing in case the judge might
ask something known to only one of the attendees ignores the possibility that the
judge would be willing to call a recess and wait for an answer if no one in the
courtroom has the answer ready.14 2
Workflow-especially the researching, drafting, revising, and finalizing of
written work-can get out of hand as well, as can deciding which professional is the
lowest efficient biller for a given task.1 43 Researching novel issues is one thing (and,
often, such research is better performed by a more senior professional than by a
novice'4 4 ), but giving a first- or second-year associate the task of, say, researching the
141 Sometimes, though, the group email is a better choice than an all-hands meeting. Context matters.
142
Lawyers will justify bringing many people to a hearing or a meeting, instead of a few.
After all, a diversity of experience will best serve the client, and having top-notch
knowledge on hand will provide better service than having to wait for someone back at
the office to provide an answer to a particular question. Lawyers who work their way up
the law-firm ladder often have very specialized expertise, so having both Partner A (with
expertise in one area of tax law) and Partner B (with a different expertise in tax law) in a
meeting will catch any errors and help to come up with a better work product. For lawyers
who are still working their way through the associate ranks, someone more senior must
supervise their work. Junior Associate X's research will get supervised by mid-level
Associate Y, who will do the first draft of a document, only to have senior Associate Z
revise the document before handing it to a partner for final revisions. One lawyer in an
office will pop into another lawyer's office to get some advice on a matter, and those pop-
in meetings can span large blocks of time as the professionals spitball ideas. Even filing
a pleading that simply states that one party agrees with some other party's position can
result in significant billed time if more than one professional has to set eyes on the draft
before it gets filed. In a time-pressured environment, such as big, bet-the-company
litigation or a takeover defense, the amount of work required is extensive. Long days are
de rigueur, with tens of people amassed to finalize a single project. Many hands may
make light work, but they certainly also make expensive work. In some very real sense,
pride ("we do good work here") and fear ("what if we've missed something?") combine
to make legal fees rise exponentially. Pride and fear are the conscious explanations. But
there are cognitive biases at work here, too.
LegalAnalytics, supra note 30, at 1276-77 (footnotes omitted).
143 See supra note 48. The snarkiness of note 48 came about because of the frequency with which I've
reviewed time entries with that workflow pattern. When Legal Decoder and I review fees, we're looking for
ways to "eliminate waste, redundancy[,] and friction in workflow processes." Comment from Joe Tiano to
author (on file with author).
144 Here's how one general counsel explains the concept of the "lowest efficient biller":
In my experience, there are basically five different types of team members-the
experienced partner/subject matter expert, the junior partner, the experienced associate,
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grounds for requesting turnover of property of the estate is not as efficient as telling
that associate to check a research bank and update the caselaw. The "lowest efficient
biller" concept does not mean always using the lowest available biller. Having a
more junior associate draft a brief or an agreement and then having a more senior
lawyer revise it can reflect sound billing judgment. Even having two or three more
senior people review and revise something very complicated can demonstrate sound
billing judgment-but only if each of those senior people is bringing his or her
specific expertise to the table (e.g., one partner is looking at tax implications, another
one is looking at provisions involving intellectual property, and so on). But there is
always the temptation, when one is reviewing a document, to add stylistic comments
that are in the nature of personal preferences, rather than to review the document's
substance. Having too many people review a draft runs the risk of making the
document worse, not better. 4 5 The rest of the world seems to understand project
the new associate, and the paralegal. Each member of the team represents a different
degree of expertise and a different range of hourly rates, and your core team may contain
one or more of these different types of team members. The objective is to efficiently
assign work to the members of the core team, who have the requisite expertise, but at the
lowest billing rate. Also, an attorney who is part of the core team and familiar with your
business should be more efficient than another attorney of equal expertise[ ] who has not
done work for your company. The final objective is to track fees paid to each member of
the team to determine if you have reached the optimal mix.
I know this may sound complicated, but it's actually pretty simple. In my experience
at The Home Depot, the law department carefully analyzed the rate/mix of each firm and
made necessary adjustments where necessary. There is no perfect mix. Some matters
require a heavier partner mix, while others require extensive paralegal and new associate
time, with little partner interaction .... Using data such as this is where we discovered a
phenomenon known to us a "rate creep." As you know, a first-year associate typically
bills out at the lowest hourly rate. However, as that associate gains experience and
progresses along the partnership track, his/her hourly rate goes up. Therefore, it may be
fine for John Doe, at $125 per hour, to perform the work of a new associate, but there
will come a time when his hourly rate will be too high for such work and a new associate
will need to be selected to do this type of work. By using the rate/mix chart, you can keep
up with these subtle changes. It is also good to review the rate/mix chart with your
relationship partner at the beginning of each year when establishing the core team and
their hourly rates for the coming year.
Survival Guide, supra note 39, at 108-09; see also Demonstrate Value, supra note 86 ("[T]he value that a
lawyer provides often is only loosely correlated with the lawyer's price tag. The value of a $1,000 / hour partner
who delivers a compelling 15-minute closing argument to win a 'bet the company' case likely provided
exponentially more than $250 in value whereas that same partner's 15-minute review of a standard NDA may
not justify the $250 price tag.").
145 Or, as Alec Issogonis once said, "[a] camel is a horse designed by committee." BRAINY QUOTE,
https://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/alecissigonis_3 12014 (last visited Dec. 31, 2019).
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management and process planning,"' and there's no reason that law firms can't use
project management tools to monitor the workflow in chapter 11 cases. 4 7
3. Monitor the Budget
There's an old saying that budgets are strategic plans with numbers attached to
them. 4" That truism probably accounts for part of the resistance to budgeting that I've
146 At least one Texas firm is very, very good at process management, and here's its philosophy:
There are a number of solutions that provide for a uniform level of service delivery
across the firm. The first is knowledge management, and by that we mean ensuring that
the best practices and documents are shared across the firm. If the thirty-year lawyer
shares her best pleading with a second-year lawyer, the more-junior lawyer is able to
raise the caliber of his practice closer to the level of the thirty-year lawyer. Another
solution is a case-handling workflow. The workflow is a timeline, with tasks and
reminders throughout the life of the case. The timeline ensures that all tasks are
completed when they need to be, and that all issues that should be considered throughout
the life of the case are considered when it is appropriate to consider them. These practices
ensure that the client knows what kind of service it will receive, no matter which attorney
is assigned to the file . . . . [T]he processes described above ensure a level of excellence
across the firm, and this excellence reflects on the firm as a whole and not just the
attorney handling the case.
Solutions-OrientedApproach, supra note 86, at 140-41 (footnotes omitted).
147 As stated by Professor Larry Bridgesmith:
So if we can, as lawyers let us consider the fact that we are not as special as we
think we are. We manage processes and we practice law. . . . [A]s process people, can
we learn from what other process experts have accomplished? In other words, can we
better manage our processes so we can practice better law?
Because if process improvement and project management can build skyscrapers,
put space shuttles in orbit, or even help launch military attacks, then we as legal service
professionals encounter no more variability or complexity in the legal work we manage
than any of those applications. So it is time to get over the notion that we are so special
that project management and process improvement cannot apply to the legal services that
we provide.
Evolving Role, supra note 79, at 445-46. Or, as Dwayne Hermes has said:
I agree strongly that attorneys think what we do is more complicated than it really is or
has to be. This is especially true as we start to use analytics to help us remove the mystery.
My real[-]life repeat example is when lawyers tell me they do not have enough
information to put a value on a case we are handling. I ask them "can you put a value
on the case if we cannot leave the meeting room until you do so?" Since the obvious
answer is that "sure I can[,]" . . . they then start to understand how to work with less than
perfect information and how to give opinions with caveats.
E-mail from Dwayne Hermes to author (July 31, 2019) (on file with author).
14s Other practice areas have used budgets and cost-controls for their outside counsel for years. See Legal
Analytics, supra note 30, at 1289-90 ("In the past eight to ten years, however, larger legal departments and
law firms have been hiring a new breed of industry experts to oversee legal-industry-specific business
operations, such as legal analytics, technology sourcing, legal-process management, pricing, client-outside
counsel relations, and financial performance.") (footnote omitted).
2020] 81
ABILAWREVIEW
seen in chapter 11 cases. 4 9 Explicit budgeting-budgeting that is attached to
retention applications and to fee applications-can signal strategy decisions that are
better done stealthily than publicly. But the budgeting communications between a
client and its outside counsel are key to establishing the parameters within which
outside counsel can act independently, versus those decisions that will require
advance notice and consent.
Chapter 11 cases are fast-moving, and there's a risk for "budget creep" if inside
counsel doesn't monitor the case's progress with regular budget-to-actual
comparisons.5 o There are two related phenomena in chapter 11 cases: "mission
creep" and "scope creep." "Mission creep" occurs when a professional takes on work
that should have been allocated to a different professional, such as when the main
bankruptcy counsel and the conflicts counsel' 5 are both handling the same matter or
when the main bankruptcy counsel and local counsel are both monitoring the
docket. 5 2 "Scope creep" has to do with the difference between the scope of work that
149 The other resistance tends to be of the "we have no idea how much this case will cost" variety. But see
infra notes 165-169 and accompanying text (suggesting experienced counsel should have at least a ballpark
idea of how much certain components of a case will cost). Hermes Law revisits and recalibrates its matter
budgets every 90 days, which increases the budget's accuracy. See E-mail from Dwayne Hermes to author
(July 29, 2019) (on file with author).
150 The Guidelines require budget-to-actual comparisons, too.
Budgets and staffing plans: Whether the fee application sufficiently explains: (i)
Any substantial increase (e.g., 10% or more) in the amount requested in the fee
application as compared to any client-approved budget; and (ii) any increase in the
number of professionals and paraprofessionals billing to the matter during the application
period as compared to any client-approved staffing plan. The United States Trustee
ordinarily will seek the use of fee and expense budgets and staffing plans, either with the
consent of the parties or by court order as soon as feasible after the commencement of
the case ....
Procedural Guidelines, supra note 9, at 36249. For a sense of how inside counsel can monitor budget
compliance, there's this example:
The DuPont Legal Model is ever evolving, and more and more, Litametrics is taking
hold. In 2013, DuPont Legal established a position titled "chief productivity officer."
Concerns about "budget creep" warranted a new approach to engaging outside counsel
on strategic budget management. There was a view that too much deference was being
given to DuPont Legal's outside providers regarding proposed staffing and activities on
litigated matters. The chief productivity officer, armed with dynamic analytics, has new
insight on outside counsel performance, similar to Billy Beane's in baseball firms that
know how to get on base (efficient delivery of work product), score runs (successful
motions) and win games (case results). The chief productivity officer has an important
seat at the table when inside litigation counsel engage the outside firm in those often-
difficult discussions about staffing, hours required, budget, and efforts needed relative to
the value of the case. This is part of change management, and the chief productivity
officer helps guide inside counsel in making hard financial management decisions.
Analytics for Selecting, supra note 96, at 78.
151 For a refresher on conflicts counsel, see supra note 43 and accompanying text.
152 See Value Billing, supra note 2, at 151-52 ("'Mission creep,' originally a military term, is commonly used
to describe the implementation of a plan whose scope has expanded mid-project or the execution of a plan that
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a bankruptcy professional is permitted to do as part of the order authorizing the
professional's employment-the court-approved scope-and the professional's
decision to add on new tasks as the case develops over time.'53 The professional may
think that the new tasks are covered by the order authorizing employment, but some
of those new tasks may be outside the scope, necessitating an amendment to the order
authorizing employment. ' 4 Without careful thought about the new tasks, a
bankruptcy professional might discover that those new tasks are non-compensable
from estate funds. Looking for overlaps in the time entries of all professionals
representing the client is one way of highlighting "mission creep," and paying close
attention to the approved budget is one way of highlighting "scope creep." Both of
those types of overlap searches are time-consuming, though.
4. Set Ground Rules About Reasonable Expenses
Most law firms already have such ground rules, such as when a professional can
charge a meal to a client or when in the evening a professional can use a car service
rather than take public transportation. Outside bankruptcy, the client is likely to
notice whether the cost of a meal is too high or when the professional stays in a luxury
hotel-and maybe the client won't object to the occasional luxury, in exchange for
exceptional professional services. Inside the world of large chapter 11 cases, though,
I've spent far too much time talking to professionals about why the bankruptcy estate
shouldn't pay for alcohol or for group meals at Del Frisco's or Nobu, why a Ritz-
Carlton or Four Seasons hotel is not the same as a Hilton or a Marriott, or why asking
a limousine driver to wait outside the courthouse during an all-day hearing is not as
good a choice as is calling the driver to come to the courthouse after the hearing has
ended.'"' When the funds paying for these expenses come out of a common pool,
those luxurious choices can lead to headlines in national papers about the excesses of
chapter 11 cases. 5 6
exceeds the original authorization.") (citing DEP'T OF THE ARMY, STABILITY OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT
OPERATIONS, FIELD MANUAL 3-07, 1-17 (Feb. 2003)).
153 See Roland Bernier, Electronic Discovery Issue: Avoiding an E-Discovery Odyssey, 36 N. KY. L. REv.
491, 514-16 (2009) (describing scope creep as the widening of the approved scope of representation, "[w]here
we at one point had a single sentence, we now have found the task expanded to a two-part, complex sentence,
and finally to [a] diagram containing four steps").
154 See id. at 514 (discussing the importance of "engaging in the appropriate level of planning" to "fortify
the process against sanctions by the court").
155 But if numerous professionals are at the courthouse, then the amount of time billed for waiting for
transportation can quickly exceed the cost of having a car service wait all day.
156 See Peg Brickley & Andrew Scurria, As PG&E Enters Bankruptcy, Professionals Flock to Potential Fee
Bonanza: An army oflawyers, bankers and financial advisers could be the big winners in PG&E's bankruptcy,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/as-pg-e-prepares-for-bankruptcy-professionals-
flock-to-potential-fee-bonanza- 11548715723; see also Dennis Romero, Lawyers Cash in on Los Angeles
Times Bankruptcy, LA WEEKLY (Mar. 30, 2010), https://www.laweekly.com/lawyers-cash-in-on-los-angeles-
times-bankruptcy/; David Barboza, The Meter Runs in Enron Case, As the Lawyers Retain Lawyers, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 25, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/25/business/the-meter-runs-in-enron-case-as-the-
lawyers-retain-lawyers.html.
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5. Consider Recommending the Appointment of a Fee Examiner or Fee Committee
in the Case
As self-serving as this recommendation is (and I'm aware that it is), I still believe
that fee examiners or fee committees are useful for the larger cases, precisely because
the level of monitoring that I'm suggesting takes a lot of time, and inside counsel may
not have that amount of free time. Fee committees are usually composed of an
independent member who takes on the fee examiner role and representatives from the
other key players in the case: a representative from the Office of the United States
Trustee, a representative from the debtor-in-possession, and a representative from an
official committee (or a representative from every committee, if there are multiple
committees). I'm a fan of fee committees,' 57 for the most part, because of the
additional perspective that members of the fee committee can provide, but there are
always going to be tradeoffs that occur, and there are other ways to keep abreast of
developments in a case. 58 All fee reviewers come with their own costs, of course.
They probably have a staff.1 5 9 They may need to retain outside counsel to file
pleadings and appear in court. These costs are added administrative expenses, so
157
Fee committees have several perceived benefits. A functional fee committee can,
among other matters:
(1) enable parties and professionals to resolve fee disputes without litigation;
(2) avoid duplication of services by questioning how matters are divided among
professionals and between the debtor and the creditors' committee;
(3) adopt case-specific, uniform billing codes to aid in understanding what estate
resources are being devoted to discrete projects;
(4) retain professional fee auditors who use computers to analyze fee applications
and identify problems;
(5) engage those parties most knowledgeable about, and involved in, the case in
scrutinizing fees; and
(6) assure the court of the propriety of approving interim or final allowance of
fees and expenses where the fee committee and professionals seeking payment
settle any objections.
Professional Fees, supra note 76.
158
The question arises as to whether fee committees "work." A vigilant fee committee
will improve the quality of applications in a case and perhaps deter unreasonable billing
practices. Egregious billing abuses can be caught early and eliminated, but this level of
scrutiny is not inexpensive, particularly when a fee committee retains professionals. The
cost of the fee committee can devour a major portion of any fee or expense reductions it
obtains.
Whether fee committees can successfully address the larger issue of reasonableness
is subject to question. With the exception of the U.S. Trustee and any independent chair,
members of the committee are almost always members of the constituencies whose
professionals' fees are under review. The dynamics of the case carry into the fee
committee meetings.
White & Theus, supra note 5, at 78 (footnote omitted).
159 I affiliate with independent contractors who work with me, not for me.
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recommending a fee examiner or fee committee is not cost-neutral. 60 But the time
savings and the expertise that a fee examiner can provide helps not just the parties in
the case, but also the bankruptcy judge, who might otherwise be overwhelmed by the
magnitude of the fee applications on top of an already overloaded docket.
C. Bring Your Bankruptcy Counsel Into the Modern Era
The suggestions that I've made are useful for large chapter 11 cases as most of
them are run now, but given the developments occurring in several areas of the law,
bankruptcy professionals can become even more efficient, with the right
encouragement from inside counsel.
1. Use Legal Analytics
Legal analytics come in a variety of forms. There are analytics that help lawyers
predict what a given judge is likely to do in certain situations.' 6' There are analytics
that help law firms analyze their billable time in order to become more internally
efficient and profitable (and those analytics can help bankruptcy counsel develop
160 See White & Theus, supra note 5 ("The cost of the fee committee can devour a major portion of any fee
or expense reductions it obtains.") (footnote omitted).
161
Lex Machina "mine[s] litigation data, [for] insights about judges, lawyers, parties,
and the subjects of the cases themselves, culled from millions of pages of litigation
information." This platform is similar to Ross, as both rely on third party information for
their augmented drafting technology versus reliance on an attorney providing the
necessary information. The benefits of Lex Machina are palpable. It provides "litigation
insights on courts, judges, lawyers, law firms, and parties, mined from millions of pages
of docket entries and documents, enabling lawyers to predict the outcomes that different
legal strategies will produce. Legal Analytics is currently available for patent, trademark,
copyright, antitrust, securities, commercial, employment, product liability, and
bankruptcy litigation in federal courts."
David Hricik, Asya-Lorrene S. Morgan & Kyle H. Williams, The Ethics of Using Artificial Intelligence to
Augment Drafting Legal Documents, 4 TEX. A&M J. PROP. L. 465, 470 (2018) [hereinafter Artificial
Intelligence] (footnotes omitted).
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useful budgets).1 6 2 There are analytics that help a law firm execute efficient
workflow.1 63 In essence, legal analytics let law firms play Moneyball.16 4
These analytics can be incredibly precise:
How much is this going to cost? From both the sophisticated
client as well as the average consumer, this is a major question raised
prior to, or early in, legal representation.... In an effort to defend
their fees or more generally avoid the commoditization of their work,
lawyers commonly highlight the unique properties of the current
dispute, transaction, or matter. So the mantra goes, "These things are
hard to predict-you know every case is different." While each case
may be different, and although its entire structure cannot be fully
captured by measurements, metrics, etc., these are no longer the days
of "[f]or professional services rendered." There is an acute and
growing understanding within the market regarding the arbitrage
opportunity that exists in intelligently assisting clients in reducing
162
Law firms are using Al to understand the distribution of their costs when providing
legal services to clients. Law firms are using Al to dig deeper into their client billing
history to better understand the resources required to handle different kinds of client
matters. Clients increasingly request fixed-fee engagements or alternative fee agreements
from law firms. But if those firms do not understand their costs, a fixed-fee engagement
poses a serious risk of cost overruns borne by the firm.
So instead of hand coding and curating past bills, firms are using Al to understand
the range and distribution of costs, computing the mean and median costs for similar
matters, and looking for facts that create outlier conditions. Firms are using tools, such
as Digitory Legal or Fastcase's Al Sandbox, to analyze their billing data in this way.
Understanding costs mitigates risk for clients and for law firms, and it can help those
firms be more competitive when seeking new business.
Ed Walters, The Aodel Rules ofAutonomous Conduct: Ethical Responsibilities of Lawyers and Artificial
Intelligence, 35 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1073, 1081 (2019) (footnotes omitted); see also Legal Analytics, supra
note 30, at 1272 (describing how legal analytics can improve a law firm's efficiency and market share); Daniel
Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Start Preparing for
the Data-Driven Future of the Legal Services Industry, 62 EMORY L.J. 909, 932-36 (2013) (discussing the
advantages of metrics in evaluating lawyer performance, both on the client side and on the law firm side).
163
The use of litigation analytics helps discover and map litigation needs. Firms that have
or develop litigation analytical tools have an advantage in a market where corporate
counsel disburse their litigation widely across multiple firms. Armed with these tools,
those firms are well positioned to comprehensively manage the entirety of a client's
portfolio despite the complexities of the technologies, data, and cultural issues.
Patrick J. Flanagan & Michelle Hook Dewey, Where Do We Go From Here? Transformation andAcceleration
ofLegalAnalytics in Practice, 35 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1245, 1266 (2019) (footnote omitted).
164 See LEWIS, supra note 68 (demonstrating how investment in scientific analysis improved the efficiency
of how the Oakland As played baseball); cf, e.g., LegalAnalytics, supra note 30, at 1270-71 (suggesting the
use of data is superior to a billing partner's gut hunches).
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their legal spending. Several analytics companies are actively
working to both aggregate large-scale datasets and leverage
approaches from the world of procurement to identify value
propositions throughout the legal service marketplace.
. . . Benchmarking, analyzing, and projecting future legal
spending costs while also contesting existing legal bills is a
significant portion of what the modem general counsel must do as he
or she operates as the maestro of the company's global legal supply
chain.
With respect to the costs of legal services, it is hard to understate
the amount of disruption this class of technology potentially
introduced. Is this lawyer really worth a $125 wage premium? Can
we shift this matter over to a cheaper firm? Can we send this matter
to the Raleigh office instead of the New York office? Once the
purchasers of legal services start asking these types of questions,
there is no retreat to the good old days of " [flor professional services
rendered. ,165
Not only are analytics useful once the professionals have been hired, but analytics are
useful in choosing among professionals in the first place.6 Analytics can help with
sorting through the many variables that might lead to a successful outcome in chapter
11 cases.6 Analytics can also help in terms of deciding which work to keep with
165 Katz, supra note 162, at 929-32 (footnotes omitted).1 66 EvolvingRole, supra note 79, at 443 (discussing how legal procurement departments can benchmark data
to enable better comparisons across law firms). What else is useful? At least one inside counsel checks out the
tech-savviness of potential law firms. See D. Casey Flaherty, Could you pass this in-house counsel's tech test?
If the answer is no, you may be losing business, ABA J. (July 17, 2013), http://www.abajournal.com/legal
rebels/article/couldyoupass this in-house counsels tech test (discussing Kia Motors's technology
competency audit).
167 As Warren Agin explains:
In many Chapter 11 cases, attorneys and courts make decisions about potential viability
by reviewing the relevant information available in the case and qualitatively evaluating
the case's prospects. Sometimes these decisions are easy ones. For example, assume that
the debtor operates a retail store, the lease was terminated pre-petition, and the landlord
is asking the court for permission to evict. Here, predicting a conversion or dismissal is
easy. In many other cases, however, deciding whether a case will succeed is very difficult
using qualitative methods. Quantitative financial analysis is often employed to ascertain
potential outcomes, but the courts themselves are limited to the analysis provided to them
by the parties, and-especially in smaller Chapter 11 cases-the parties lack access to
financial professionals capable of doing an adequate job using quantitative methods. In
any case, financial professionals of case parties are often tasked with providing a
quantitative basis to support a particular outcome; these analyses are valuable but not
statistically relevant. Statistical models can certainly supplement other techniques, as
well as provide a mechanism for decision making using smaller information sets.
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main bankruptcy counsel and which work should go to efficiency counsel, to contract
attorneys, or to computers. 68 There is always going to be a role for human judgment
in the high-level tasks of the most skilled and experienced lawyers, but good
judgment is best accompanied by good data.1 6 9
2. Suggest that Bankruptcy Counsel Use Artificial Intelligence for More Than Just
Document Production Work
There are now artificial intelligence programs that support legal research and
basic contract drafting, and the use of such programs will increase over time.
Artificial intelligence, when coupled with human intelligence,1 70 can create
significant efficiency in the delivery of legal services,' 7  and the firms that use
artificial intelligence appropriately can set themselves apart from the more traditional
law firms.1 7 2 Why couldn't main bankruptcy counsel use computers to develop first
Warren E. Agin, Predicting Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Case Outcomes Using the Federal Judicial Center IDB
and Ensemble Artificial Intelligence, 35 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1093, 1114 (2019); see also id. at 1115 ("If
systematically deployed in a decision process, these models can enhance human judgment and intuition ....
Al and machine-leaming-based models can provide dynamic and statistically accurate results to support
decision-making in ways not currently available.").
168 See Legal Analytics, supra note 30, at 1292 (discussing how legal analytics can refine and improve
staffing decisions).
169 Interpreting data correctly, of course, is a skill all its own.
170 See Solutions-OrientedApproach, supra note 86, at 137 ("Lawyers should ask themselves what processes
can be automated with technology and seek to implement that automation. This approach frees up lawyers to
focus on the aspects of their practice that truly require human judgment."); see also Katz, supra note 162, at
929 ("In sum, for the appropriate tasks, the age of quantitative legal prediction is about a mixture of humans
and machines working together to outperform either working in isolation. The equation is simple: Humans +
Machines > Humans or Machines.").
171 And, from an ethics viewpoint, lawyers should be on the lookout for better ways to serve clients
competently. See Walters, supra note 162, at 1079 ("[T]he Model Rules actually propel lawyers and their firms
forward. Rule 1.1, read in conjunction with Comments 5 and 8, requires law firms to employ measures,
including Al and data analytics, to ensure that they meet standards of reasonable competence in
representation.").
172
New York-based Risk Enterprise Management ("REM"), a third-party insurance
claims administrator, developed an outsourcing partnership with Legal Research Center
("LRC") on the recommendation of the Association of Corporate Counsel. Overall, REM
was implementing convergence strategies with its outside counsel and, as most
corporations, seeking to reduce litigation costs....
REM and LRC launched a pilot program with approximately 70 of REM's outside
law firms. REM involved its outside counsel in the development of the program to help
enlist their support. The pilot program proved successful both in verifying the potential
cost savings and the ability to outsource and improve the overall quality of its legal
research and was expanded and institutionalized.
Under the program, LRC administered a database of REM's critical, reusable legal
knowledge. REM outside counsel submitted briefs and memoranda of law to LRC for
archiving in the REM database. When outside counsel considered an issue, they first
consulted the LRC database for existing research. The database contained approximately
2,000 documents covering an average of three issues each about 6,000 total issues.
Almost one in four inquiries resulted in a "hit" that translated into cost savings.
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In addition to the savings from reusing legal research, REM enjoyed savings by
encouraging its outside counsel to outsource REM's legal research to LRC. According to
REM, since LRC attorneys specialize in legal research, they perform the work more
efficiently, at a lower cost, and often achieve superior results.
In addition to legal research, REM called on LRC to perform factual research on
experts, opposing counsel, and other background information. Finally, REM asked LRC
to perform surveys of injury awards to help them value cases appropriately and plan their
case strategy.
The effectiveness of unbundling legal research can be obtained by rolling out a
research management program with just one group within a corporate legal department.
In 2009, Legal Research Center rolled out a program like that used with REM for the
litigation group of a Fortune 500 company. Work product reuse is being observed and
additional cost savings achieved as a result of changes in law firm behavior beyond the
cost savings projected solely from using an outsourced provider. Even after a
convergence program, law firms respond favorably to creating a sense of competition
between outside counsel. One way to instill a sense of competition is to let the outside
counsel firms know that they are being measured on their degree of participation in
contributing research to the system, using the system to find reusable research, and using
the preferred research provider. A simple measure like tracking the requested delivery
timeframes for research can be used to show general counsel the outside counsel firms
who are better at planning and managing the research aspects of their matters. A firm that
consistently requests research on a short time-frame demonstrates less planning and
project management skill than those who are able to better plan in advance for research
needs. If the research provider's fees are tied to delivery timeframes, then you can see a
tangible financial benefit associated with using the latter group of firms. If the outside
counsel firms are advised that they are being measured in this manner, the drive to excel
at customer satisfaction can increase the overall level of planning exhibited across the
firms.
Vance K. Opperman et al., 1 SUCCESSFUL PARTNERING BETWEEN INSIDE AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL § 19:35
(Apr. 2019) (footnotes omitted). At least one high-profile law firm is already using artificial intelligence to
assist in drafting incorporation documents, saving both time and money:
Legal forms are hardly new. Since the middle ages when lawyers used forms of
action, templates helped reduce the cost of law. But machine intelligence will
revolutionize the use of legal forms. Most obviously, machine intelligence will help tailor
these forms to meet individual situations....
... Fenwick & West, a firm whose principal office is in Silicon Valley, developed
a program that automatically creates the documents for incorporating startups. Matt
Kesner, their technology officer, said: "It reduced the average time we were spending
from about 20 to 40 hours of billable time down to a handful of hours . . . . In cases with
even extensive documents, we can cut the time of document creation from days and
weeks to hours."
In the future, machine processing will be able to automate a form, tailor it according
to the specific facts and legal arguments, and track its effect in future litigation. As
hardware and software capacity improves, so too will the generated documents. We
predict that within ten to fifteen years, computer-based services will routinely generate
the first draft of most transactional documents.
John 0. McGinnis & Russell G. Pearce, The Great Disruption: How Aachine Intelligence Will Transform the
Role of Lawyers in the Delivery ofLegal Services, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041, 3050-51 (2014) [hereinafter
Great Disruption] (footnotes omitted).
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drafts of more documents? 73 Why can't law firms turn to computers for basic legal
research on non-novel concepts? 74 Admittedly, the more useful that computers are,
the less training in traditional work the first-year and second-year associates will
receive, 7 5 and that phenomenon bodes ill for the professional development of good
lawyers. And I'm not sure that even IBM's Watson can replicate the kind of "happy
coincidence" research in which one answer triggers a potentially useful additional
line of thinking. 7 6 Even the most sophisticated computers have their limits.'7 7 But
inside counsel can and should be asking each law firm pitching its services to discuss
how the firm would determine the most efficient allocation of workload, and getting
an answer of "we figure out it as we go" is a sign for inside counsel to look elsewhere.
173 See Great Disruption, supra note 172, at 3052 ("Ultimately, these kinds of programs will be able to
provide drafts of briefs and memos, as well as connect to legal research programs, which will provide data for
the writing program. As with legal search, we expect substantial progress in programs over the next fifteen
years until they deliver very useful drafts. In the decade or two after that, such programs may deliver more
finished products, at least for low-value transactions."); see also Kevin D. Ashley, Automatically Extracting
Meaning From Legal Texts: Opportunities And Challenges, 35 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 1117, 1119 (2019)
(discussing the many companies that can assist in computer-drafted legal work); Artificial Intelligence, supra
note 161, at 469 (describing computer-assisted drafting services).
174
Another job traditionally given to junior lawyers was legal research. It was much
cheaper for a junior lawyer to research the latest law on a given matter at a lower charge
out rate than a partner. Now, Al driven programs are revolutionizing legal research,
building upon the digitalization that has occurred over the last 20 years. A number of
companies have developed applications that are able to conduct legal research and this
process will improve the more it is used. The providers of legal research applications
include Ravel Law, ROSS Intelligence, Lexis Answers, Westlaw Answers, and Blue J
Legal, all of which claim to offer artificial intelligence, machine learning, and natural
language processing to identify key cases, and to extract relevant passages of judgments
based on natural language search terms. Already, these applications are providing faster
and more relevant answers to legal searches than any junior lawyer could.
Guihot, supra note 88, at 451-52 (footnotes omitted).
175 See infra Part IV (discussing how solutions that increase efficiency may decrease professional
development).
176 But computers probably won't go down too many rabbit holes, either, unlike baby lawyers. Even if the
computers do go down every rabbit hole, they'll do so much more quickly than humans can.
177
Al [artificial intelligence] programs cannot read legal texts like lawyers can. Using
statistical methods, Al can only extract some semantic information from legal texts. For
example, it can use the extracted meanings to improve retrieval and ranking, but it cannot
yet extract legal rules in logical form from statutory texts . . . . ML [machine learning]
may yield answers, but it cannot explain its answers to legal questions or reason robustly
about how different circumstances would affect its answers. Third, extending the
capabilities of legal text analytics requires manual annotation to create more training sets
of legal documents for purposes of supervised ML.
Ashley, supra note 173, at 1120.
90 [Vol. 28: 39
LEGAL FEES IN LARGE CHAPTER 11 CASES
IV. THE As-YET UNSOLVED PROBLEM: THE LAWYER-DEVELOPMENT PYRAMID IS
BUILT ON SHAKY GROUND NOW
One problem with all of my suggestions is that they may lead to fewer
professional training opportunities for the newest lawyers. Gone are the days when
new lawyers learned by watching more experienced lawyers take depositions or
negotiate deals. 78 Also gone are the days when big litigation led to several lawyers
and paralegals working long days, holed up in document production rooms, sifting
through mountains of potentially relevant material. Computers do that work faster-
at least the first cut of sifting-without getting bored or hungry in the process. Where
are the opportunities for training the newest entrants into our profession? Law
schools probably can't pick up the slack. Most "podium" professors 79 are often far
removed from the current practice of law, and clinics have to grapple with the limits
of an academic calendar. The problem with using computers to do basic legal work
is that some law-trained human has to analyze that work and determine its accuracy
and usefulness. If we're cutting the newest lawyers out of the grind of tasks like
document production or contract drafting, then how will they develop the skills that
they'll need to become truly competent? I don't have an answer for that, and I don't
have an answer for the question of how, exactly, law firms are supposed to be able to
make ends meet if their billable hours decrease due to increased efficiency.'so As is
almost always true, David Wilkins says it best:
One of the most important promises that firms make to those whom
they recruit is that they will provide these young lawyers with
excellent training in the skills and dispositions that they need to
become accomplished and skilled practitioners. In recent years,
however, this promise has grown increasingly illusory. The reasons
for this trend are undoubtedly multiple and mutually reinforcing.
Clients, weary of an ever-changing cast of untrained-and
undoubtedly relatively unproductive-junior lawyers shuffling in
and out of their projects, are increasingly unwilling to pay for the
178 Gone, too, are the days when clients would pay for "learn by watching" training.
179 Those who don't teach in clinics.
180
It is clear that a good part of the systematized work of the junior lawyer such as research,
discovery review and contract review for due diligence, for so long the entree into legal
work for lawyers, will eventually be performed by machines involving also perhaps only
a supervising senior lawyer . . . . [Sean] Larkan, a law firm consultant, argued that
consistent low leverage [the ratio of junior lawyers to partners] leads to a range of
unsatisfactory outcomes for partners, lawyers, and clients including that: "[p]artners are
forced to do work that would normally be delegated down to the lowest competency
level. This may mean higher writeoffs, where certain types of work do not justify high
rates, and unhappy clients."
Guihot, supra note 88, at 459 (footnotes omitted).
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work of first-year and second-year associates. At the same time,
partners eager to boost their profits per partner are unwilling to
absorb this cost either. The result, as Ben Heineman and I have
elsewhere argued, is a "lost generation" of associates who are coming
of age in law firms without proper supervision or training. This is a
disaster for both firms and clients. Law firms (at least until the
current downturn) were shedding associates at prodigious rates-in
many cases up to twenty-five percent per year. Although young
lawyers change jobs for many reasons, recent research on the
attitudes and careers ofjunior associates suggests that a perceived-
and, I would argue real-lack of training and mentoring in large law
firms is a significant cause. For their part, clients are likely to have
increasing difficulty finding trained third-year and fourth-year
associates-particularly ones with experience in handling (and
understanding) their business-if most of the talented first-year and
second-year lawyers have already left.""
In other words, the suggestions that I'm making for controlling costs in large chapter
11 cases carry the very real risk that the next generation of bankruptcy lawyers will
have less hands-on experience in a variety of situations. That result is bad for
bankruptcy law, and it's bad for companies going through chapter 11. But I don't
have a solution.
CONCLUSION
Efficiency isn't the only important factor in a chapter 11 case. Chapter 11 cases
also require creativity, negotiation skill, dogged determination, emotional
intelligence, and luck. But efficiency still matters in terms of controlling the size of
the administrative expenses associated with court-appointed professionals. And
bankruptcy courts can't possibly find all of the inefficiencies that can emerge from
the combination of the fast-paced nature of chapter 11 cases and the attenuated link
between fees and the estate-based payment of those fees. In order to keep those fees
reasonable, inside counsel can do a great deal to set the ground rules, in much the
same way that they do with non-bankruptcy work. We need their help.
181 Wilkins, supra note 79, at 2108-09 (footnotes omitted). It's possible, though, that by finding ways to
decrease overhead, law firms might be able to work more training into the care and feeding of new
associates without sacrificing overall profitability. Without such training, firms are eating their own seed
corn.
Copyright 2020 American Bankruptcy Institute. For reprints, contact www.copyright.com.
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